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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RUSSELL E. BISNER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20000026-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. His 
petition challenged his convictions for murder and aggravated robbery. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court properly grant the State's motion for summary judgment? 
Standard of Review. "In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, [this 
Court] give[s] no deference to its conclusions of law," but "review[s] the grant of summary 
judgment for correctness." Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com% 2004 UT 
11, H 3,492 Utah Adv. Rep. 5. The Court '"review[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Id. (quoting 
Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 101, % 2, 57 P.3d 1067) (internal quotation omitted), 
cert denied, 538 U.S 945, 123 S.Ct 1632 (2003). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999) 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when 
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful 
force. However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that 
force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent 
the commission of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances 
specified in Subsection (1) if he or she: 
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to 
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, 
unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to 
the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person 
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force; and 
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by themselves, 
constitute "combat by agreement": 
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing 
relationship; or 
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal right to 
be. 
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened 
force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully 
entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(c). 
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated 
assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and 
aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape, 
object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a 
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child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and 
arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other 
felony offense which involves the use offeree or violence against a person so 
as to create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also 
constitutes a forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, defined in Section 76-6-
204, does not constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied 
at the time unlawful entry is made or attempted. 
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the 
trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or 
serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002) 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground 
that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief 
on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF FACTS2 
In the early morning hours of January 6, 1999 petitioner fatally shot Darby Golub 
with an assault rifle as Darby attempted to flee to safety. R. 450: f^ 2. 
Sometime between 9:00 and 10:30 the night before, petitioner and his friend Derek 
Pearson visited Chris Lyman at his Sandy apartment to purchase LSD. R. 450: f 3. The two 
visited Lyman for fifteen to twenty minutes. R. 450: f 3. During their conversation, 
petitioner told Lyman that he was going to meet someone that night who owed him money. 
R. 450: T[ 3. As the two left Lyman's apartment, petitioner declared, "Someone is going to 
die tonight." R.450:^[3. 
After leaving Lyman's apartment, the two went to the home of Justin Koontz where 
other friends had gathered to party. R. 450: ^ f 4. Justin's mother was working that evening at 
a nearby 7-Eleven and his father was upstairs sleeping. R. 450-51: U 4. The friends partied 
downstairs into the early morning hours of the next day, drinking alcohol and using drugs. 
R. 451:^ 4 &n.3. 
Petitioner had discussed with his friends a $350 drug debt Darby owed him. R. 451 : 
5. From the party, petitioner telephoned Darby, leaving a message that he was supposed to 
have paid on the drug debt that day. R. 451: f^ 5. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Darby 
returned the call. R. 451: *| 6. Darby yelled at Justin because of a late call to his house and 
2
 The Summary of Facts are taken, in most instances verbatim, from the trial court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. See R. 450-57 (Addendum A). 
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Justin rejoined with a similar complaint. R. 451: <| 6. After speaking with Justin, Darby 
spoke with Dustin Symes, another of petitioner's friends. R. 451: f 7. Darby again 
complained of the late call to his house. R. 451: <f 7. He also threatened to kill petitioner and 
his friends. R. 451: J^ 7. After an angry exchange of words, Darby agreed to meet petitioner 
and his friends in the parking lot of the Canyon Center, a nearby shopping center, to settle 
the dispute. R. 451: % 7 & n.4. Petitioner and his friends went expecting a fight. R. 451: ^ 7. 
After hanging up, Dustin discussed the called with petitioner, Derek, and Justin, and 
considered the possibility of taking guns. R. 452: % 8 & n.5. Anticipating a fight, the four 
left in Dustin's truck to meet Darby at the Canyon Center parking lot. R. 452: <f 8. Finding 
no one there, Dustin drove to the 7-Eleven located on the southeast corner of the parking lot 
where Justin's mother was working that evening. R. 452: % 9. Petitioner, Dustin, and Derek 
remained outside, talking with Justin's mother who was on break smoking a cigarette. R. 
452: *H 9. Justin went inside, helped himself to the condiment bar, and spoke with another 7-
Eleven employee. R. 452: |^ 9. 
After a few minutes at the 7-Eleven, the three friends outside saw Darby's truck pull 
into in the Canyon Center parking lot just south of the middle businesses. See R. 452: *| 10. 
Justin's mother went back into the convenience store and notified her son of Darby's arrival. 
See R. 452: f 10. Extremely agitated and upset, Justin ran out of the store and joined his 
friends in Dustin's truck. R. 452: ^ 11. As Justin exited the store, either he or his mother 
exclaimed, "That chicken shit wouldn't show up." R. 452: f 11. After Justin left, his mother 
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remarked to her co-worker, "I just sent him down to a fight at the Smith's. I guess that's not 
a very good mother to send him down to do that." R. 452: ^[11. 
Dustin parked his truck kitty-cornered to Darby's truck some twenty to thirty feet 
away. R. 453: ^ f 12. Darby, who was alone, exited his truck and stood with an assault rifle 
cradled in his arms. R. 453: ^ f 12. Petitioner and his friends exited their truck and quickly 
advanced on Darby. R. 453: ^ f 13. As Dustin described it, the four "walk[ed] extremely fast" 
towards Darby. R. 453: ^ 13 . Although he had a rifle, Darby simply backed up as the four 
advanced and made no threat with the weapon. R. 453: ^  14. He did not fire the rifle nor did 
he use it to otherwise defend himself. R. 453: f 14& n.6. Dustin, who brought with him an 
aluminum baseball bat, thrust the bat at Darby, cutting his forehead, knocking him backward, 
and causing him to drop the rifle. R. 453: ^  15. Justin followed with a punch to Darby's leg. 
R. 453: H 15. 
Having disarmed Darby, Dustin returned to his truck and Justin followed. R. 453: ^ 
16. Confused, Darby asked, "Why are you doing this?" R. 453: ^ f 16. Darby was eventually 
forced to the ground as petitioner and Derek continued to beat on him for some thirty 
seconds. R. 453: f^ 16. Dustin yelled for his friends to get back in the truck and all but 
petitioner complied. R. 453: Tf 16. 
Just as the three were climbing back into Dustin's truck, Darby lifted himself off the 
ground, got into his truck, closed the door, and began speeding away through the parking lot. 
R. 454: ^ f 17. Based on the tire marks and the estimated speed of Darby's truck, the accident 
reconstructionist opined that Darby "was rapidly trying to turn away from something or get 
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away from something." R. 454: % 21. Meanwhile, petitioner picked up the rifle, cocked it, 
and fired three successive rounds at Darby as he fled in his truck. R. 454: f 18. Although 
the shots missed Darby, at least one round broke one of the truck's windows. See R. 454: f 
18. The witnesses estimated that Darby was some one to three car lengths away when 
petitioner fired the first series of shots. R. 454: f 19. An accident reconstructionist testified 
that the shattered glass was about 65 feet from the first set of three shell casings found in the 
parking lot. R. 454: If 19. 
As Darby continued to speed away through the parking lot, petitioner fired another 
three rounds. See R. 454: f^ 20. This time, one of the rounds grazed the driver's door, 
pierced the window, and fatally struck Darby in the back of the head. See R. 454: <|[ 20, R. 
223: 455: <[ 23. The reconstructionist estimated Darby's truck to be traveling "about 39 
miles an hour" at one point. R. 454: f^ 21. The reconstructionist testified that the second 
location of shattered glass was approximately 145 feet from the shell casings found in the 
parking lot. R. 454: *| 22. The medical examiner agreed that "this was not a close shooting." 
R. 454: If 22. 
After Darby was struck by the fatal bullet, his truck continued straight through the 
parking lot towards the Rainbo gas station. R. 455: f 24. It ran over a parking island and 
small tree, jumped over a curb and snow bank bordering the gas station, ran over a second 
tree, and hit a concrete trash can, causing the truck to spin out of control before resting in the 
Rainbo parking lot. R. 455: ^ f 24. By the time witnesses reached the truck, Darby was dead, 
slumped over onto the floor of the passenger side. R. 45 5: ^  25. After petitioner shot Darby, 
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Dustin drove away in his truck with Derek and Justin, while petitioner fled on foot through 
an alleyway between the stores at the shopping center. R. 455: f 25. 
Petitioner was taken into custody a few hours later at his home. R. 455: ]f 26. Once 
petitioner was in custody, police searched the home where petitioner lived with his mother 
and other family members. R. 455: ^ f 26. Police found the assault rifle used to kill Darby 
partially hidden behind clothing in an open closet underneath the stairs. R. 455: <|[ 26. 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Trial Proceedings. Petitioner was charged with murder and aggravated robbery, both 
first degree felonies. R. 455: f^ 27. The trial court denied pretrial motions to quash the 
bindover and to suppress evidence seized from petitioner's house. R. 456: <|fl[ 30-31. The 
Utah Supreme Court denied a petition for interlocutory review of the order denying 
petitioner's motion to suppress. R. 456: f^ 32. 
Petitioner was thereafter tried by a jury. R. 450: ^ j 1. After the State rested its case, 
petitioner moved for a directed verdict, but that motion was denied. R. 456: f 33. The 
defense rested without presenting evidence. R. 456: f 34. In his closing argument, defense 
counsel conceded that petitioner shot the victim, Darby Golub, but asked the jury to find 
petitioner guilty of only manslaughter, arguing that he was acting under an extreme 
emotional disturbance. R. 456-57: f^ 34. The jury rejected the defense's theory of the case 
and found petitioner guilty as charged. R. 457: If 35. They also found that petitioner had 
used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the murder. R. 457: ^ 35. Petitioner 
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unsuccessfully moved for an order merging the aggravated robbery conviction with the 
murder conviction. R. 457: f 36. 
The trial court sentenced petitioner to consecutive prison terms of five-y ears-to-life on 
each count plus a consecutive one-year term for use of a firearm. R. 457: f 37. In 
pronouncing sentence, the trial court remarked that it was particularly "tragic that the victim 
here was trying to get away, that he sought to retreat, that he was in his truck speeding away 
from the scene, trying to flee; yet you, in a cold and calculating way, continued to fire the 
weapon multiple times [at] this victim under no threat of any kind whatsoever." R. 457: f 
38. 
Direct Appeal. Defendant appealed his convictions to the Utah Supreme Court, 
raising five claims of error: (1) whether the prosecutor's seeming failure to disclose alleged 
"cooperation agreements" with state witnesses violated petitioner's due process rights; 
(2) whether the search of defendant's home violated his Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting evidence of the victim's drug debt to petitioner; (4) whether the manslaughter 
instruction was correct; and (5) whether the trial court properly denied petitioner's motion to 
merge his convictions for aggravated robbery and murder. R. 461-62: ^} 55-56,60-65; State 
v. Eisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 30, 37 P.3d 1073. The Supreme Court rejected all five claims. R. 
461-62: \\ 57-65; Eisner, 2001 UT 99. 
Post-conviction Proceedings. Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Relief Under the 
Post-conviction Remedies Act, alleging an unlawful search of his home and ineffective 
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assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. R. 12-67. After review, the post-conviction 
court ordered the State to file a responsive pleading. R. 107-08. In a Motion for Partial 
Dismissal Without Prejudice and for Partial Summary Judgment, the State moved for an 
order to (1) dismiss petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as 
procedurally barred; (2) dismiss without prejudice petitioner's claim that appellate counsel 
should have challenged trial counsel's effectiveness for failing to investigate witnesses who 
could have testified regarding petitioner's state of mind at the time of the crime; and (3) deny 
petitioner's remaining claims on the merits as a matter of law. R. 113-14,129-45. The State 
argued that petitioner's "state of mind" claim should be dismissed without prejudice because 
petitioner had failed to allege sufficient facts to support it. R. 135-36. In response, petitioner 
moved for leave to amend. R. 414-17. In a minute entry ruling, the post-conviction court 
granted the State's summary judgment motion in all respects and ordered the State to prepare 
an appropriate order. R. 425. Less than two weeks later, the court granted petitioner's 
motion for leave to amend, giving him ten days to file the amended petition. R. 429. 
Petitioner did not thereafter file an amended complaint. See 429-33. The court then entered 
a final order dismissing without prejudice petitioner's "state of mind" claim and denying all 
other claims. R. 449-69. Defendant timely appealed. R. 439. 
10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the 
ground that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. That claim is procedurally 
barred because he could have raised that issue on appeal. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel. Petitioner claims that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. Petitioner's claim fails because none of the issues that petitioner alleges should 
have been raised were "dead-bang winners." 
Petitioner did not dispute at trial that he fired the weapon that killed the victim. 
Moreover, the evidence conclusively established that the victim was some 145 feet away 
from petitioner, fleeing in his truck, when he was shot near the back of the head with the 
fatal bullet. Therefore, even if a gunshot residue test had confirmed that the victim initially 
fired the gun, petitioner still would not have succeeded on a theory of self-defense. 
Petitioner's remaining ineffectiveness claims also fail—state witnesses were adequately 
impeached, the jury was well aware that the fatal bullet was not a direct hit, and petitioner 
was not entitled to access of all of the discovery. 
Conflict of Interest. Petitioner also claims that a friendship between appellate counsel 
and trial counsel created a conflict of interest. Petitioner failed to demonstrate any conflict. 
Withholding of Evidence. Petitioner also claims that the prosecutor withheld material 
evidence. This claim was not alleged below, and in any event, petitioner has not established 
that the prosecutor withheld any information. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Petitioner challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing 
petitioner's post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 
See Aplt. Brf.3 Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). A review of the trial court's ruling reveals that its grant of summary judgment 
was correct. 
A. PETITIONER' S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 
WAS PROCEDURALLY BARRED 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for a variety of reasons. R. 18-19. The post-conviction court dismissed this 
claim as procedurally barred under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (2002). R.463. On 
appeal, defendant challenges the dismissal of this claim and adds yet more grounds for 
finding ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Aplt. Brf. at 6, 31-34 (alleging that he 
"was denied the effective assistance of trial. . . counsel"). Petitioner's challenge fails. 
Section 7 8-3 5 a-106 provides that a petitioner "is not eligible for relief under [the Act] 
upon any ground tha t . . . could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Utah 
3
 Petitioner has not challenged the post-conviction denial of his claim that police 
conducted an illegal search of his room. See Aplt. Brf. at 35-36 (stating that appellate 
counsel's search and seizure claim "had no basis in law"). 
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Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (2002). Petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective could have been raised on direct appeal. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT76, fflf 
9-17,12 P.3d 92 (observing that with the 1992 adoption of rule 23B, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, defendants have the procedural mechanism to raise any claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel). Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly concluded that 
petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were procedurally barred. Cf. 
Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, f 14, 44 P.3d 626 (holding that petitioner in habeas 
proceeding—now superceded by Act—was procedurally barred from raising claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he could have raised them on direct appeal). 
B. PETITIONER' S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE 
COUNSEL FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner also claimed that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for not alleging on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to: (1) argue and present evidence of self-defense; (2) impeach State witnesses with 
their plea agreements; (3) make known to the jury that the fatal bullet ricocheted off the truck 
before striking the victim; and (4) provide petitioner with discovery and otherwise keep him 
informed of the defense. R. 18-20. The post-conviction court correctly concluded that these 
claims fail as a matter of law.4 
Petitioner is not procedurally barred from raising ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-106(2) (providing that "a person may be eligible for 
relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if 
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel"). 
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To succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the test 
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Petitioner must 
show first, "'that his [or her] counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced [petitioner].'" Carter, 2001 
UT 96, % 31 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994)) (brackets added in 
Carter). In the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, petitioner 
must establish that counsel "'omitt[ed] a "dead-bang winner" on appeal. Id. at f 48 (quoting 
Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995)). A "dead-bang winner" is "an 
'issue which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would have resulted in 
reversal on appeal.'" Id. (quoting Banks, 54 F.3d at 1515 n.13). The post-conviction court 
correctly concluded that appellate counsel omitted no "dead-bang winners" on appeal. 
1. An Appellate Claim that Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Not 
Pursuing a Theory of Self-defense Was Not a "Dead-bang Winner." 
The primary focus of petitioner's post-conviction claim is that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for not challenging trial counsel's failure to pursue a theory of self-defense. On 
appeal, petitioner claims that trial counsel should have: (1) produced the test results of a 
purported gunshot residue test of the victim's hands; (2) called experts to testify about the 
location of the shell casings at the scene; (3) emphasized that his friends had contusions on 
their hands, that the dispute was over late telephone calls rather than a drug debt, and that his 
friends were the first to attack the victim; and (4) introduced evidence of the victim's 
propensity for violence and his aggressive and paranoid state of mind that evening, e.g., that 
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the victim was found with a 31-inch chain in his hand, was hyped up on drugs, and came 
with a rifle. See Aplt. Brf. at 9, 12-16, 18, 24-29, 31-36. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, most of this evidence was made known to the jury and 
the victim's alleged behavior as the aggressor was forcefully argued to the jury. For 
example, trial counsel argued in closing that it was Darby not defendant who threatened to 
kill petitioner and his friends, that it was Darby who came with an assault rifle, that Darby 
was "drug-crazed," and that the purpose of the meeting was never about a drug debt, but 
about the late telephone calls. See R. 350-52 (Addendum B). Petitioner claims, however, 
that his trial counsel should have argued self-defense because he had no intention of killing 
Darby when he went to the parking lot that night and that Darby, not he, was the aggressor. 
See Aplt Brf at 14-17, 20-21, 44. 
Under the Utah Criminal Code, "[a] person is justified in threatening or using force 
against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful 
force." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (1999). Deadly force may not be used unless the 
person "reasonably believes that [such] force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily 
injury to himself or a third person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, 
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1). 
Moreover, a person may not claim self-defense if he "was the aggressor or was engaged in a 
combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates 
to the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person continues or 
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threatens to continue the use of unlawful force." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(2)(c). A 
review of the evidence reveals that defendant was not entitled to pursue a theory of self-
defense. 
The evidence at trial was uncontested that after an angry exchange of words on the 
telephone between the victim and petitioner's friends, petitioner and his friends agreed to 
meet the victim to settle their dispute. R.451:^|7(R. 153-55, 160, 164, 166-67,175,179).5 
Although petitioner alleges that the dispute was over the late telephone calls rather than a 
drug debt, see Aplt. Brf. at 35-36, all agreed that they met Darby that night expecting a fight. 
R. 452: *{ 8 (R. 154, 160, 166, 173-74, 176). The testimony was likewise undisputed that 
Darby initially had a rifle, but that petitioner and his friends assaulted Darby and wrested it 
away from him. R.453:ffl[ 12-15 (R. 154-57,161-65,168,177-78,181-82). Moreover, the 
evidence at trial was uncontroverted that Darby was fleeing in his truck when he was fatally 
shot. In addition to the testimony of petitioner's three friends, a 7-Eleven clerk who 
witnessed the incident testified that Darby was shot as he was speeding away from the scene. 
R. 187-88. The tire marks from Darby's truck confirmed that Darby'"was rapidly trying to 
turn away from something or get away from something.'" R. 454: }^ 21 (quoting from R. 
199). And finally, the evidence demonstrated that Darby was some 145 feet away from 
petitioner when he was shot near the back of the head With the fatal bullet. R. 454: \ 22 (R. 
201,215-16). 
5
 The record cites in parentheses refer to the trial transcripts included as exhibits in the 
State's Motion for Partial Dismissal Without Prejudice and Partial Summary Judgment. 
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Petitioner was the only other person known to have witnessed the shooting, but he did 
not testify. He belatedly proffers on appeal a version of events that differs from the 
testimony at trial, but only in insignificant respects that still do not support a theory of self-
defense. Petitioner asserts that after his friends ran back to the truck, he continued to 
struggle with Darby over the gun and that during the struggle "the gun went off two or three 
times." Aplt. Brf. at 22. Even had counsel introduced gunshot residue tests confirming that 
Darby had fired the gun at this time, it would not have supported a theory of self-defense. 
Only if Darby had been shot at that time would petitioner have been able to claim self-
defense or better under petitioner's facts.6 The evidence, however, established that Darby 
was not shot at close range and petitioner acknowledges that Darby jumped into his truck 
and drove off. R. 454: ^  22; Aplt. Brf. at 22. He then admits that "as [Darby] started to drive 
off [he] fired a couple of rounds" toward Darby. Aplt. Brf. at 22 (emphasis added). 
A defendant is entitled to argue self-defense only if "there is a basis in the evidence, 
whether the evidence is produced by the prosecution or by the defendant, which would 
provide some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a killing was done to protect the 
defendant from an imminent threat of death by another." State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211,214 
(Utah 1985); accordUtzh Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (1999). Thus, even under petitioner's 
version of the facts—even had Darby been the initial aggressor and even had gunshot 
6
 In contrast to petitioner's claim on appeal, a 7-Eleven clerk who witnessed the 
shooting testified that the first three shots were fired as the victim began to turn around some 
islands in the parking lot and that the last three or four shots were fired after the victim had 
completed his turn and gone some distance. R. 187-88. 
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residue been found on Darby's hands—petitioner would not have been entitled to pursue a 
theory of self-defense because he shot a retreating victim who posed no imminent threat to 
him. See State v. Knotts, All S.E.2d 917, 924 (W.V. 1992) (holding that defendant not 
entitled to self-defense instruction even if the victim initially stabbed him with a knife 
because victim thereafter retreated and defendant pursued him and killed him). 
And even if trial counsel had presented a theory of self-defense to the jury, it is not 
reasonably likely to have resulted in a different outcome at trial. See, e.g., Mariscal v. State, 
687 N.E.2d 378,381 (Ind. App. 1998) (jury properly found that defendant did not act in self-
defense where victim "was attempting to retreat at the time [defendant] attacked him with a 
knife"); State v. Wilson, 613 So.2d 234, 239 (La. App. 1993) (jury properly rejected self-
defense claim where "fatal shot was fired at the victim [while he] was retreating into his 
vehicle for safety); 
* * * 
In summary, an ineffectiveness claim based on trial counsel's failure to pursue a 
theory of self-defense was not a "dead-bang winner." See Carter, 2001 UT 96, % 48. To the 
contrary, such a claim would have been futile. The jury heard no evidence that would have 
supported it and the evidence petitioner preferred in this proceeding still would not have 
supported it. The post-conviction court thus correctly rejected petitioner's claim that 
appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging trial counsel's failure to pursue and 
present evidence of self-defense. 
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2. An Appellate Claim that Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Not 
Impeaching State Witnesses with Plea Agreements Was Not a 
"Dead-bang Winner." 
Petitioner also asserts that appellate counsel should have claimed that trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to impeach State witnesses with the plea agreements they entered 
with the State. This claim fails because petitioner's trial counsel did impeach the State's 
witnesses and the impeachment value of any additional questioning about their plea 
agreements would have been negligible. 
Chris Lyman. Contrary to petitioner's claim, his trial counsel did impeach Chris 
Lyman. On cross-examination, petitioner's trial counsel elicited admissions from Chris 
Lyman that he served only two days of a ten-day jail sentence, and had a fine waived, in 
exchange for his statement to police. R. 228-29, 231. He also elicited admissions from 
Lyman that the investigating officer had told him the officer would not make an explicit deal 
with him because "it would make it look like a deal was made for [Lyman] to talk," and it 
would not appear to a jury that Lyman's statement was willingly given. R. 230-31. 
Furthermore, in his closing argument, petitioner's counsel argued that Lyman was a "little 
liar" who "made a deal to stay out of jail by giving some testimony," but is "still trying to 
deny it." R. 351. 
Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz. The jury was also aware of the State's plea 
agreements with Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz. Pearson testified that although he was 
charged with riot, a third degree felony, for his involvement in the murder, he pled guilty to 
attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor and assault, a class B misdemeanor. R. 170-71. 
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Likewise, Koontz testified that although he was originally charged with murder for his 
involvement in the crimes, he pled guilty to attempted riot, a class a misdemeanor and 
assault a class B misdemeanor. R. 179, 185. Koontz also testified at trial that although he 
believed AP&P had recommended that he serve 18 months in jail, he only served 71 days. 
R. 185. 
While the jury was not expressly told that these pleas were part of a plea agreement, 
the jury certainly made this inference. Moreover, because the jury was aware of the benefits 
that Pearson and Koontz received for their statements, appellate counsel could not have 
demonstrated that petitioner suffered any prejudice from trial counsel's handling of this 
issue. 
Dustin Symes. Dustin Symes testified at petitioner's preliminary hearing that "the 
State had agreed to '[i]nform the court of my testimony and [that] I was cooperative' 
following his appearance as a witness in [petitioner's] case." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f^ 
40, 37 P.3d 1073. This specific agreement was not discussed at trial. However, Symes did 
testify that he had been charged with aggravated assault, a felony, and that it was his 
intention to plead guilty as charged. R. 159. 
Although Symes apparently received some agreement from the State in exchange for 
his testimony, and that agreement was not discussed at trial, petitioner could not demonstrate 
that he suffered any prejudice as a result of his trial counsel's actions. Apparently the State 
had not offered Symes a "plea deal" because he testified that his intention was to plead guilty 
as charged. R. 890: 30-31. Therefore, any agreement that Symes had with the State lacked 
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the impeachment value of the plea bargains offered to Pearson and Koontz. Moreover, even 
after hearing evidence of the State's agreements with Lyman, Pearson, and Koontz, the jury 
apparently still believed their testimony because they found petitioner guilty. 
In any event, petitioner suffered no prejudice from any failure of trial counsel to 
impeach Lyman, Symes, Pearson, and Koontz with additional evidence of their plea 
agreements. As observed by the Utah Supreme Court on direct appeal, "the State introduced 
overwhelming evidence at trial that [petitioner] killed [Darby] Golub intentionally or 
knowingly." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, *[{ 64. Indeed, even without the testimony of these four 
men, evidence from the 7-Eleven clerk, the accident reconstructionist, and the medical 
examiner conclusively established that Darby was fleeing in his car, some 145 feet away 
from petitioner, when petitioner shot Darby in the back of the head'with the fatal bullet. R. 
454: % 22 (R. 201, 215-16). Thus, even had trial counsel further pressed the issue of the 
men's plea agreements, no reasonable likelihood existed of a different result. 
* * * 
Because trial counsel effectively impeached Lyman, Pearson, and Koontz with the 
benefits they had received for their testimony, and because the evidence was overwhelming 
that petitioner shot Darby as he was fleeing, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang 
winner" when he did not allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not challenging 
trial counsel's failure to further impeach the men's testimony with their plea agreements. 
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3. An Appellate Claim that Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Not 
Making Known to the Jury that the Fatal Bullet Ricocheted Off the 
Truck Before Striking the Victim Was Not a "Dead-bang Winner." 
Petitioner also claims that his appellate counsel should have argued that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce expert testimony indicating that the fatal 
bullet was not a direct hit, but ricocheted off of Darby's truck. This claim is frivolous 
because the jury was made aware of that fact. 
The medical examiner testified that the fatal bullet struck the truck's doorframe before 
piercing Darby's skull. R. 214-17. The medical examiner recovered from Darby's skull 
pieces of black plastic material consistent with the material on the truck's door frame. R. 
214-16. The trial court also received into evidence State's Exhibit 22, a photograph showing 
where the bullet had stuck the truck's doorframe. R. 217. 
Because the jury heard this evidence, appellate counsel could not have prevailed on a 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce expert testimony of the same 
fact. Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winner" and the post-
conviction court correctly rejected the claim as a matter of law. 
4. An Appellate Claim that Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing 
to Provide Petitioner with Discovery Was Not a "Dead-bang 
Winner." 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner also claimed that appellate counsel 
should have argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide him with the 
discovery received from the State and for failing to keep him informed of the defense he was 
preparing. R. 19. The post-conviction court denied that claim as a matter of law, R. 467, 
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and petitioner does not appear to challenge that conclusion on appeal. Indeed, these were not 
"dead-bang winner [s]" because petitioner's allegations concern matters of trial strategy that 
ultimately fall within counsel's discretion. 
"Trial counsel's decision whether to provide his client with discovery materials 
constitutes a matter of trial strategy and judgment that ultimately lies within counsel's 
discretion." People v. Davison, 686 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (111. App. Ct. 1997). Trial counsel 
may believe that it is not helpful to allow a defendant access to discovery materials for 
several reasons. Id. For example, "[a]n unknowledgeable client may put great weight upon 
or become distracted by discrepancies in the discovery that counsel understands are trivial or 
of no import to the defense." Id. Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his counsel's 
strategic decisions based upon the defendant's reading of discovery materials "might disrupt 
counsel's management of the case and undermine the attorney-client relationship." Id. 
Providing discovery materials to a defendant might also interfere with counsel's ability to 
understand the defendant's version of events. Id. "The defendant could become fixated on 
what the State's witnesses say happened, making it more difficult for counsel to get 
defendant focused on those matters that counsel knows—due to his or her vastly greater 
training and experience—are important to the case." Id. 
Likewise, the decision of which defense to present is a matter of trial strategy. For 
example, in State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 556-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the defendant 
argued that his counsel was ineffective for formulating a defense theory and then abandoning 
that theory mid-trial. The Utah Court of Appeals recognized, however, that "[t]he change in 
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defense appears to be nothing more than a change in strategy." Id. Moreover, the court held 
that "any election between inconsistent defenses was a legitimate exercise of trial strategy 
rather than ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. (citing State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 
219 (Utah CtApp. 1988)). 
A reviewing court "will not second-guess a trial attorney's legitimate use of judgment 
as to trial tactics or strategy." State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah App. 1988) (citations 
omitted). Petitioner's allegations regarding counsel's alleged failure to provide him copies 
of discovery, and to keep him informed of the defense he was preparing, concern matters of 
trial strategy. Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winner" on appeal 
with respect to these allegations. 
In any event, appellate counsel could not have demonstrated that petitioner suffered 
any prejudice as a result of trial counsel's actions. To have established prejudice, appellate 
counsel would have had to demonstrate that had trial counsel performed differently, there 
was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 
See Carter, 2001 UT 9 6 4 31 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Apparently,petitioner's 
complaints with his counsel's failure to provide him copies of discovery, and to keep him 
informed of the defense he was preparing, concern petitioner's complaint that counsel should 
have pursued a self-defense theory at trial. As discussed above, the facts of petitioner's 
crime did not support a self-defense theory. Moreover, petitioner fails to allege any other 
facts or theory that would demonstrate how the outcome of his trial would have been 
different had his counsel provided him with discovery or kept him informed of the defense 
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he was preparing. Consequently, these claims were not "dead-bang winners" and the post-
conviction court thus correctly denied petitioner's claims as a matter of law. 
C. PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT APPELLATE 
COUNSEL HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
Petitioner also claims that his appellate counsel had a conflict of interest because they 
were recommended by trial counsel. Aplt. Brf. at 6, 33-39. Petitioner points only to trial 
counsel's motion to withdraw, which recommended the appointment of his eventual 
appellate attorneys, as evidence of a conflict. Aplt. Brf. at 15, 30. That motion established 
no such conflict. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the motion did not establish a friendship or 
conflict between trial counsel and appellate counsel. The motion simply recommended the 
appointment of attorneys that were competent to represent petitioner on appeal. This claim 
thus fails. 
D. PETITIONER HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE PROSECUTOR 
WITHHELD EVIDENCE 
Petitioner also alleges on appeal that the prosecutor did not disclose exculpatory 
material to the defense, and in particular, a purported gunshot residue test on the victim's 
hands which he claims revealed that the victim had fired a gun. Aplt. Brf. at 7-21. In the 
first place, he has produced nothing that indicates the test result was positive. His claim that 
the purported test was positive is thus pure conjecture. In the second place, as discussed 
above, even a positive test result would not have supported a claim of self-defense. And 
finally, an alleged failure by the prosecutor to disclose material evidence was not claimed in 
the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, he cannot raise that claim as a ground 
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for reversal on appeal. See Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1977) (holding 
that issues "issues not raised in the pleadings nor presented at trial.. . cannot be considered 
for the first time on appeal"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the trial 
court's order granting partial dismissal and partial summary judgment, advent 
Respectfully submitted March 12, 2004. 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 020911933 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This matter came before the Court on the State's motion for partial dismissal without 
prejudice and for partial summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the petition, the State's 
motion and supporting memorandum, the petitioner's opposition in the form of a motion for leave to 
file an amended complaint, and the State's reply memorandum. Now being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court makes the following findings of undisputed fact, conclusions of law, and enters 
the following order granting the State's motion. 
FILE! PISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG - 4 
» ? - - '"^^ Deputy Clerk 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT 
The Crimes 
1. Petitioner was convicted of murder and aggravated robbery following a jury trial. 
Minutes Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, attached as Exhibit A.1 The State presented the 
following evidence at petitioner's trial: 
2. In the early morning hours of 6 January 1999 petitioner fatally shot Darby Golub with an 
assault rifle as Darby attempted to flee to safety. R. 890: 145-46, 159 (Trial Transcript Vol. I), 
attached as Exhibit B; R. 891: 183, 201, 245-47, 251-60,269-70 (Trial Transcript Vol. II), attached 
as Exhibit C. 
3. Sometime between 9:00 and 10:30 the night before, petitioner and his friend Derek 
Pearson visited Chris Lyman at his Sandy apartment to purchase LSD. R. 889: 3-4, 21 (Partial Trial 
Transcript: Testimony of Christopher Bruce Lyman), attached as Exhibit D. The two visited Lyman 
for fifteen to twenty minutes. R. 889: 4-5, 22. During their conversation, petitioner told Lyman that 
he was going to meet someone that night who owed him money. R. 889: 05. As the two left 
Lyman's apartment, petitioner declared, "Someone is going to die tonight." R. 889: 5; see also R. 
889: 22-24. 
4. After leaving Lyman's apartment, the two went to the home of Justin Koontz where other 
friends had gathered to party. See R. 890: 56-57; see also R. 890: 4-5, 93-94. Justin's mother was 
1
 The exhibits referred to are attached to the State's memorandum supporting its motion. 
2
 References to transcripts are to the record as paginated for appeal. For example, R. 890 
refers to trial record page 890, which is volume one of the trial transcript. The numbers following 
the colon refer to the specific pages of the transcript. Therefore, the citation "R. 890: 145-46," refers 
to pages 145-46 of volume one of the trial transcript. 
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working that evening at a nearby 7-Eleven and his father was upstairs sleeping. R. 890: 10-11, 14-
15, 94, 99. The friends partied downstairs into the early morning hours of the next day, drinking 
alcohol and using drugs. R. 890: 5-6,10, 57, 94,113-14.3 
5. Petitioner had discussed with his friends a $350 drug debt Darby owed him. See R. 890: 
8-9, 58-59. From the party, petitioner telephoned Darby and left a message that he was supposed to 
have paid the drug debt that day. R. 890: 58-59. 
6. Darby returned the call at approximately 2:00 a.m. R. 890: 6, 9-10, 94-96. Darby yelled 
at Justin because of a late call to his house and Justin rejoined with a similar complaint. R. 890: 95, 
112. 
7. After speaking with Justin, Darby spoke with Dustin Symes, another of petitioner's 
friends. R. 890: 4-6, 34, 58-59, 94. Darby again complained of the late call to his house. R. 890: 7-
8. He also threatened to kill petitioner and his friends. R. 890: 7-8, 35, 88-89. After the angry 
exchange, Darby agreed to meet petitioner and his friends in the parking lot of the Canyon Center, a 
nearby shopping center, to settle the dispute. R. 890: 13-14, 34-35, 51, 60-61.4 Petitioner and his 
friends went expecting a fight. R. 890: 12, 36, 60, 88-89. 
Derek Pearson, who had accompanied petitioner to Lyman's house, testified that he had 
been smoking marijuana most of the night and that he took six "hits" of LSD at approximately 11:00 
that evening. R. 890: 57, 79. Justin Koontz also acknowledged at trial that he had smoked 
marijuana that evening. R. 890: 114. 
4
 The Canyon Center, similar to a strip mall, includes a Smith's grocery store on the west 
end, a Shopko at the east end, and a variety of smaller businesses in between. A large parking lot lay 
to the south of the businesses. R. 890: 13-14, 36,162,168. A Rainbo Mart and a 7-Eleven sit on the 
southern-most borders of the Canyon Center parking lot, facing 9400 South—the Rainbo gas station 
sits directly south of the middle businesses and the 7-Eleven sits in the southeast corner. R. 890: 14, 
146, 163; R. 891: 176. Witnesses referred to the parking lot as either the Shopko or the Smith's 
parking lot. SeeR. 890: 8,13-14, 36, 61, 64, 97,100,114,140-41; R. 891: 175. 
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8. After hanging up, Dustin discussed the called with petitioner, Derek, and Justin, and 
considered the possibility of taking guns. R. 890: 9-10, 35-36, 60-62, 78.5 Anticipating a fight, the 
four left in Dustin's truck to meet Darby at the Canyon Center parking lot. R. 890: 8-12, 36, 39, 53, 
61-62, 98. 
9. Finding no one there, Dustin drove to the 7-Eleven located on the southeast corner of the 
parking lot where Justin's mother was working that evening. R. 890: 13-14, 61-62, 99. Petitioner, 
Dustin, and Derek remained outside, talking with Justin's mother who was on break smoking a 
cigarette. R. 890: 14, 37, 62-63, 78-79,138-39,152. Justin went inside, helped himself to the 
condiment bar, and spoke with another 7-Eleven employee. R. 890: 15, 63, 78, 99, 137-38,152. 
10. After a few minutes at the 7-Eleven, the three friends outside saw Darby's truck pull into 
in the Canyon Center parking lot just south of the middle businesses. See R. 890: 14-16, 37-39, 63-
64, 73-74, 99,139. Justin's mother went back into the convenience store and notified her son of 
Darby's arrival. See R. 890: 140. 
11. Extremely agitated and upset, Justin ran out of the store and joined his friends in 
Dustin's truck. R. 890: 17, 64, 99-100. As Justin exited the store, either he or his mother exclaimed, 
"That chicken shit wouldn't show up." R. 890: 140, 153. After Justin left, his mother remarked to 
her co-worker, "I just sent him down to a fight at the Smith's. I guess that's not a very good mother 
to send him down to do that." R. 890: 140. 
Although both Dustin and Justin denied any talk of weapons, R. 890: 43, 98, 115, Derek 
testified they did have that discussion. R. 890: 60, 62, 78. 
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12. Dustin parked his truck kitty-comer to Darby's truck some twenty to thirty feet away. R. 
890: 17-18, 38, 64-65,100-01, 116, 141-42,154. Darby, who was alone, exited his truck and stood 
with an assault rifle cradled in his arms. R. 890: 19-21, 38-39,41, 54, 65,101-02. 
13. Petitioner and his friends exited their truck and quickly advanced on Darby. R. 890: 18-
23, 66-68,102-05. As Dustin described it, the four "walk[ed] extremely fast" towards Darby. R. 
890: 20-21. 
14. Although he had a rifle, Darby simply backed up as the four advanced and made no 
threat with the weapon. R. 890: 103.6 He did not fire the rifle nor did he use it to otherwise defend 
himself. R. 890: 21, 66-68, 90, 105. 
15. Dustin, who brought with him an aluminum baseball bat, thrust the bat at Darby, cutting 
his forehead, knocking him backward, and causing him to drop the rifle. R. 890: 12-13, 21-23, 43-
44,46, 54-55, 68,103-04. Justin followed with a punch to Darby's leg. R. 890: 104-05. 
16. Having disarmed Darby, Dustin returned to his truck and Justin followed. R. 890: 23-24, 
44-45, 105, 120-22. Confused, Darby asked, "Why are you doing this?" R. 890: 69, 83. Darby was 
eventually forced to the ground as petitioner and Derek continued to beat him for some thirty 
seconds. R. 890: 22-24, 44-45, 66-68, 83,104-05, 143. Dustin yelled for his friends to get back in 
the truck and all but petitioner complied. R. 890: 24-25, 47, 69, 84,105-06, 121. 
6
 Dustin Symes testified that he never saw Darby point the gun at them, R. 890: 19-20, 38-
39,41, 54, and Justin Koontz testified that he didn't remember Darby pointing the gun at them. But 
see R. 890: 102 (claiming Darby was waiving the gun). Only Derek Pearson, who acknowledged he 
was high on alcohol and drugs, testified that Darby pointed the gun at them. R. 890: 65-66, 82. 
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17. Just as the three were climbing back into Dustin's truck, Darby lifted himself off the 
ground, got into his truck, closed the door, and began speeding away through the parking lot. R. 
890:144,157. 
18. Meanwhile, petitioner picked up the rifle, cocked it, and fired three successive rounds at 
Darby as he fled in his truck. R. 890: 25-27, 70-71, 106-08, 123, 128-29. Although the shots missed 
Darby, at least one round broke one of the track's windows. See R. 890: 27; R. 891: 185, 196-97, 
252. 
19. The witnesses estimated that Darby was some one to three car lengths away when 
petitioner fired the first series of shots. R. 890: 27, 50, 54,144,158. An accident reconstructionist 
testified that the shattered glass was about 65 feet from the first set of three shell casings found in the 
parking lot. R. 891: 185,192. 
20. As Darby continued to speed away through the parking lot, petitioner fired another three 
rounds. See R. 890: 145,159; R. 891: 183,192, 197. This time, one of the rounds grazed the 
driver's door, pierced the window, and fatally struck Darby in the back of the head. See R. 890: 
145-46,159; R. 891: 183, 201, 245-47, 251-60, 269-70. 
21. Based on the tire marks and the estimated speed of Darby's truck, the accident 
reconstructionist opined that Darby "was rapidly trying to turn away from something or get away 
from something." R. 891: 186. The reconstructionist estimated Darby's truck to be traveling "about 
39 miles an hour" at one point. Id. 
22. The reconstructionist testified that the second location of shattered glass was 
approximately 145 feet from the shell casings found in the parking lot. R. 891: 192. The medical 
examiner agreed that "this was not a close shooting." R. 891: 251. 
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23. The medical examiner testified that the fatal bullet had struck the truck's doorframe 
before piercing Darby's skull. R. 891: 246,250, 253-56. The medical examiner recovered from 
Darby's skull pieces of black plastic material consistent with the material on the truck's door frame. 
R. 891: 246,250, 254. The trial court also received into evidence State's Exhibit 22, a photograph 
showing where the bullet had stuck the truck's doorframe. R. 891: 255-56. 
24. After Darby was struck by the fatal bullet, his truck continued straight through the 
parking lot towards the Rainbo gas station. It ran over a parking island and small tree, jumped over 
a curb and snowbank bordering the gas station, ran over a second tree, and hit a concrete trash can, 
causing the truck to spin out of control before resting in the Rainbo parking lot. R. 890: 27-28, 72, 
146,148; R. 891: 180-81,183. 
25. By the time witnesses reached the track, Darby was dead, slumped over onto the floor of 
the passenger side. R. 890: 148-49,164-65. After petitioner shot Darby, Dustin drove away in his 
truck with Derek and Justin, while petitioner fled on foot through an alleyway between the stores at 
the shopping center. R. 890: 28, 48, 72,109. 
26. Petitioner was taken into custody a few hours later at his home. R. 891: 215. Once 
petitioner was in custody, police searched the home where petitioner lived with his mother and other 
family members. R. 891: 204-05. Police found the assault rifle used to kill Darby partially hidden 
behind clothing in an open closet underneath the stairs. R. 891: 206-12. 
27. The State charged petitioner with murder and aggravated robbery, both first degree 
felonies. Information, attached as Exhibit E. 
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28. Petitioner was represented at trial by Ralph Dellapiana and Matthew Nielsen of the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender's Association. Minutes, Jury Trial, dated 24 August 1999, attached as Exhibit 
F. 
29. There is no evidence in the record that a gun-shot residue (GSR) test was performed on 
the victim. 
Relevant Procedural History 
30. Petitioner filed motions to quash the bindover and to suppress evidence seized from his 
house, including the murder weapon. Motion to Quash Bindover, attached as Exhibit G; Motion to 
Suppress Evidence and Supporting Memorandum, attached as Exhbit H. 
31. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied both motions. Minutes, Law 
& Motion dated 17 May 1999, attached as Exhibit I; Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, 
attached as Exhibit J. 
32. Petitioner filed a petition for interlocutory review of the order denying his motion to 
suppress, which the Utah Supreme Court denied. Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory 
Order, attached as Exhibit K; Order from Utah Supreme Court dated 18 August 1999, attached as 
Exhibit L. 
33. Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict after the State rested. Minutes, 
Jury Trial, dated 25 August 1999, attached as Exhibit M; R. 891: 283. 
34. The defense rested without presenting evidence. Exhibit M at 2; R. 891: 287-88. In his 
closing argument, petitioner's counsel conceded that petitioner was the one who shot Darby, but 
argued that petitioner acted under an extreme emotional disturbance and was therefore only guilty of 
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manslaughter. R. 894: 32-33 (Partial Trial Transcript: Motion in Limine / Openings, Closings & 
Exceptions), attached as Exhibit Q. 
35. The jury found petitioner guilty on both counts and further found that a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the murder. Exhibit A; Minutes, Jury Trial, 
Notice, dated 26 August 1999, attached as Exhibit N. 
36. Nineteen days after the verdict, but before sentencing, petitioner unsuccessfully moved 
to merge the aggravated robbery conviction with the murder conviction. Motion to Arrest Judgment, 
attached as Exhibit O; Exhibit A at 2; R. 895: 3-8 (Sentencing Transcript), attached as Exhibit P. 
37. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced petitioner to consecutive prison terms of five-years-
to-life on each count plus an additional one-year term for use of a firearm. Exhibit A; R. 895: 26-27. 
38. In pronouncing sentence the trial court remarked, "In particular, it seems to me it's tragic 
that the victim here was trying to get away, that he sought to retreat, that he was in his truck 
speeding away from the scene, trying to flee; yet you, in a cold and calculating way, continued to 
fire the weapon multiple times after this victim under no threat of any kind whatsoever." R. 895: 26-
27. 
The Alleged "Cooperation Agreements " 
39. Christopher Lyman. On cross-examination, petitioner's counsel asked Lyman if he 
had made any agreement with the State in exchange for his testimony. R. 889: 6. Lyman responded 
"No, I was not given immunity or any kind of written statement... that I would not be prosecuted." 
R. 889: 6-7. He also explained, "they could not promise but they told me they wouldn't be 
prosecuting me." R. 889: 7. 
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40. When asked whether he had discussed "getting out of some jail time" if he would give a 
statement, Lyman responded, "In a sense, yes." R. 889: 8-9. Lyman explained that at the time he 
gave his statement to police, he was facing a jail sentence often days and that he ended up serving 
only two days. R. 889:10-11. A fine was also waived. R. 889: 18-19. Nevertheless, there was 
never any agreement to reduce his jail time in exchange for his statement. R. 889: 11-12. 
41. Petitioner's counsel was able to elicit, however, Lyman's acknowledgement that the 
investigating officer had told him the officer would not make an explicit deal because "it would 
make it look like a deal was made for [Lyman] to talk," and it would not appear to a jury that 
Lyman's statement was willingly given. R. 889: 15-17. 
42. Petitioner's counsel also suggested that the prosecution had agreed that in exchange for 
Lyman's testimony it would not prosecute Lyman for his admitted drug dealings with petitioner. R. 
891: 279-80. The prosecutor explained, however, that no such deal was ever made. R. 891: 282-83. 
Rather, the State simply told Lyman that it could not prosecute him for his admitted drug distribution 
because the only evidence it had of the crime was Lyman's admission, and his admission alone was 
insufficient to support a prosecution on drug distribution charges. R. 891: 282-83. 
43. In his closing argument, petitioner's counsel argued that Lyman was a "little liar" who 
"made a deal to stay out of jail by giving some testimony," but is "still trying to deny it." R. 894: 38 
(Partial Trial Transcript of Motion in Limine / Openings, Closings & Exceptions), attached as 
Exhibit Q. Petitioner's counsel argued that the jury should completely disregard Lyman's testimony 
because he had lied about his alleged deal with the prosecution. R. 894: 38-40. 
44. Derek Pearson & Justin Koontz. In a sworn affidavit, the prosecutor stated that prior 
to trial he had told petitioner's counsel that "both Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz had pled guilty 
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to one count of attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor and one count of assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, reduced from the original charge of riot, a third degree felony, and that they were 
expected to testify truthfully for the State." Affidavit of Robert L. Stott, attached as Exhibit R. 
45. During trial, Pearson testified that although he was charged with riot, a third degree 
felony, for his involvement in the murder he pled guilty to attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor, 
and assault, a class B misdemeanor. R. 890: 76-77. 
46. During trial, Koontz similarly testified that although he was originally charged with 
murder for his involvement in the crimes he pled guilty to attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor, 
and assault a class B misdemeanor. R. 890: 109-10,134-35. 
47. Koontz also testified at trial that although he believed AP&P had recommended that he 
serve 18 months in jail, he only served 71 days. R. 890: 135. 
48. Dustin Symes. At petitioner's preliminary hearing, Symes "testified that the State had 
agreed to '[i]nform the court of my testimony and [that] I was cooperative' following his appearance 
as a witness in [petitioner's] case." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,140, 37 P.3d 1073, attached as 
Exhibit S. 
49. This specific agreement was not discussed at trial. Symes did testify, however, that he 
had been charged with aggravated assault, a felony, and that it was his intention to plead guilty as 
charged. R. 890: 30-31. 
50. Specific Procedural History. Prior to trial, petitioner filed a motion to exclude 
testimony from any State witnesses with whom the State made any undisclosed "agreements, 
inducements, offers of leniency, or other understandings" for their cooperation or testimony. Motion 
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to Exclude Testimony of Certain Witnesses, attached as Exhibit T. The trial court did not 
immediately rule on the motion to strike. 
51. In conjunction with his motion for a directed verdict following the State's evidence, 
petitioner also argued that the testimony of Chris Lyman, a State witness, should be stricken because 
the State did not disclose an alleged "cooperation agreement" with Lyman. Exhibit M at 2; R. 89]: 
278-83. That motion was denied. Exhibit M at 2; R. 891: 283-85. 
52. Petitioner timely moved for a new trial, renewing his argument that the State did not 
disclose the alleged "cooperation agreement" with Chris Lyman. Motion for New Trial and 
Supporting Memorandum, attached as Exhibit U. The trial court denied the motion. Minute Entry 
Ruling, dated 23 November 1999, attached as Exhibit V; Order Denying Defendant's Motion for 
New Trial, attached as Exhibit W. 
53. After the trial court announced its decision denying the motion, but before it entered a 
final written order, petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for a new trial. 
Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for New Trial, and Supporting Memorandum, attached as 
Exhibit X. That motion was never decided by the trial court and petitioner timely filed a notice of 
appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. Notice of Appeal, attached as Exhibit Y. 
54. In an effort to obtain a ruling on his motion to reconsider, petitioner moved to dismiss 
the appeal without prejudice pending disposition of his motion to reconsider. This Court denied the 
motion, holding that a motion to reconsider is not valid under the rules and that "[t]he trial court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider anything further in this case because petitioner timely filed his notice 
of appeal." Order from Utah Supreme Court dated 31 August 2000, attached as Exhibit Z. 
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The Appeal 
55. Petitioner appealed his conviction, raising five claims of error. State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 
99, f 30, 37 P.3d 1073, attached as Exhibit S. He was represented on appeal by Richard Mauro and 
Michael Sikora. Id. at 1076 
56. Petitioner first claimed that "the trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial, since 
the State violated [petitioner's] due process rights by failing to disclose its alleged cooperation 
agreements with Koontz, Lyman, Pearson, and Symes." Id. at f 30. 
57. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this claim. With respect to Lyman, the Court held that 
"the defense knew days before trial about the State's alleged agreement to reduce the jail sentence 
and fine imposed in Lyman's unrelated misdemeanor in exchange for his testimony in [petitioner's] 
trial." Id. at f 37. Moreover, the Court held that "[petitioner's] attorney was able to used this 
information extensively at trial in an attempt to impeach Lyman's testimony." Id. 
58. With regard to the alleged agreement not to prosecute Lyman for drug distribution, the 
Court held that the defense "was afforded a full opportunity" to question Lyman regarding the 
alleged deal but failed to do so. Id. at f 38. Therefore, the was no violation of petitioner's rights 
with regard to any alleged failure to disclose agreements with Lyman. Id. at Iff 37-38. 
59. Likewise, regarding the alleged failure to disclose agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and 
Symes, the Court held that petitioner's rights were not violated because his counsel was aware of 
any agreements and had the opportunity to question the witnesses at trial regarding the agreements. 
Id. at f 40. Furthermore, the Court observed that both Koontz and Pearson testified at trial regarding 
the agreements. Id. 
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60. Petitioner's second contention on appeal was "that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress the evidence removed from his living quarters in his mother's basement, namely, 
the assault rifle used to kill Golub." Id, at f 41. 
61. The Court rejected this claim, holding that petitioner's mother voluntary consented to 1he 
warrantless searches of her home and therefore "the trial court did not err in denying his motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from his living quarters in his mother's basement." Id, at ffif 52-53. 
62. Petitioner's third contention on appeal was "that the trial court erred by denying his 
motion to exclude evidence of the drug debt Golub owned him." Id, at Tf 54. The Court rejected this 
claim, holding that the evidence was admissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence because 
it was relevant as to petitioner's motive and intent, and its probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Id, at Tffl 56-59. 
63. Petitioner's fourth contention on appeal was that the trial court erroneously instructed the 
jury regarding manslaughter. Id, at f 60. The Court noted, however, that it had previously upheld an 
identical manslaughter instruction and therefore rejected petitioner's claim. Id, at f 61. 
64. Petitioner's fifth contention on appeal was that the trial court erred in refusing to merge 
his convictions for aggravated robbery and murder. Id. at f 62. The Court rejected this claim, 
holding that under the facts of this case the two crimes did not merge. Id. at f 63-65. 
65. The Utah Supreme Court also observed that "the State introduced overwhelming 
evidence at trial that [petitioner] killed Golub intentionally or knowingly." Id, at 64. The Court then 
went on to detail the supporting evidence, including evidence that petitioner shot Darby as he was 
"speeding away" in his truck. Id, 
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The Post-Conviction Petition 
66. Petitioner claims he is entitled to post-conviction relief on the following grounds: 
a. His trial counsel was ineffective because he: 
1. failed to investigate witnesses that would have testified as to P's state of 
mind at the time of the crime; 
2. refused to argue that the crime was committed in "self-defense"; 
3. failed to investigate and impeach the state's witnesses by mentioning the 
plea agreements they had entered; 
4. failed to argue to the jury that the bullet that struck the victim ricocheted 
off the truck and was not a direct hit; 
5. failed to call expert witnesses to testify about the results of gun-shot 
residue tests on the victim's hands; 
6. failed to call experts to testify regarding the victim's state of mind; 
7. failed to provide petitioner with the discovery he received from the State 
and failed to keep petitioner informed of the defense he was preparing; 
b. The police conducted an illegal search of his room; and 
c. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on appeal, the above 
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Petition at 7-9. 
67. Petitioner fails to specifically identify any additional witnesses defense counsel should 
have called or proffer what their testimony would have been. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. All of petitioner's claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel are procedurally 
barred because petitioner could have raised them on direct appeal. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-
106(l)(c). 
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2. Petitioner's claim alleging that the search of his bedroom was illegal is procedurally 
barred because it was already litigated both at trial and on direct appeal. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
35a-106(l)(b). 
3. Petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on appeal, 
his allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. To demonstrate that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective, petitioner must show that his counsel overlooked a "dead-bang winning" claim, in other 
words, a claim that was 1) obvious from the record; and 2) probably would have resulted in reversal 
See Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, f48,44 P.3d 636 (citing Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 
(10th Cir. 1995)). Each of petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fail as a 
matter of law except for his first claim, which is inadequately pled. 
a. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate witnesses who would 
have testified as to petitioner's state of mind. This claim is inadequately pled because petitioner 
fails to specifically allege which additional witnesses his trial counsel should have called and proffer 
what their testimony would have been. Therefore, this claim should be dismissed without prejudice 
and with leave to amend. 
b. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's failure to argue that petitioner acted in self-
defense. The undisputed facts at trial conclusively refuted any claim that petitioner acted in self-
defense. Petitioner would not have been entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense. Therefore, 
appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" ineffectiveness claim by omitting this issue. 
c. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate and impeach the 
State's witnesses with their plea agreements. Trial counsel impeached Christopher Lyman with 
his plea agreement and argued that he was a liar who had tried to conceal the agreement. The jury 
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was also aware of the State's plea agreements with Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz. Therefore, 
appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" argument with respect to trial counsel's 
questioning of these witnesses. 
The State apparently agreed to inform the court handling Dustin Symes' trial that he was 
cooperative and had testified in petitioner's trial. Symes' agreement was not discussed at 
petitioner's trial. Nevertheless, 1) Symes' agreement lacked the impeachment value of the other 
witness's agreements because the State had not agreed to reduce his charges; 2) the jury was aware 
of the other witness's plea agreements and still chose to believe their testimony, and 3) the State 
produced overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt. Therefore, appellate counsel did not overlook 
any "dead-bang winning" argument with respect to trial counsel's questioning of Symes. 
d. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to argued that the fatal bullet had 
ricocheted. The medical examiner testified that the fatal bullet struck the truck's doorframe before 
piercing Darby's skull and State's Exhibit 22 was a photograph showing where the bullet struck the 
truck's doorframe before hitting Darby. Because the jury heard evidence that the fatal bullet had 
ricocheted, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for allegedly failing to present this evidence. 
e. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's failure to present evidence of gun-shot residue tests 
on the victim's hands. There is no evidence in the record that a gun-shot residue (GSR) test was 
performed on the victim's hands. Petitioner's belief that a test was performed apparently stems from 
his misinterpretation of the transcript of his police interrogation. Petitioner has not provided the 
Court with a copy of the transcript and no copy appears in the record. According to petitioner, the 
interrogating officer allegedly stated, "The GSR kit says that it went off in your hand. It's all over 
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actually. It's on both your hands." Clearly the officer refers to both of petitioner's hands, rather 
than to petitioner's and Darby's hands. Because petitioner's claim has no basis in fact appellate 
counsel was not ineffective for omitting it. 
In any event, even if a GSR test indicated that Darby had fired some weapon at some time, 
there was still no evidence to support a theory that petitioner acted in self-defense. The undisputed 
evidence at trial established that Darby was unarmed and fleeing in his truck when petitioner shot 
him. Therefore, even if such GSR test results existed, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang 
winning' claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce the evidence at trial. 
f. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's failure to call experts to testify regarding the 
victim's state of mind. Evidence of the victim's state of mind would have been inadmissible 
hearsay. See state v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1964) (citing State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937 
(Utah 1988)). It would have also been irrelevant because there was no evidence that the killing was 
a suicide, a result of self-defense, or an accident to which the victim contributed by acting as an 
aggressor. See id. Appellate counsel was unlikely to succeed on a claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to introduce inadmissible, irrelevant evidence. 
In any event, the jury heard evidence that Darby was angry, had threatened to kill petitioner 
and his friends, and that petitioner and his friends were expecting a fight when they met Darby. 
Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" argument with respect to this 
claim because counsel could not have demonstrated that petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
performance. 
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g. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to provide petitioner with discovery 
and keep him informed of the defense. Trial counsel's decisions regarding whether to provide his 
client with discovery and which defense to present are matters of trial strategy that ultimately fall 
within counsel's discretion. See People v. Davidson, 686 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (111. App. Ct. 1997) 
(discovery); State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 556-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (choice of defense). 
Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" ineffectiveness claim with respect 
to these allegations. 
Even if these were not matters of strategy, appellate counsel could not have demonstrated 
that petitioner suffered any prejudice as a result of trial counsel's actions. Petitioner contends that 
the failure to provide him with discovery and to keep him informed of the defense deprived him of 
the opportunity to assert a claim of self-defense. However, the undisputed facts presented at trial 
conclusively refuted any claim of self-defense. Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-
bang winning" argument with respect to these claims. 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions the Court enters the following: 
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ORDER 
1. The State's motion for partial dismissal without prejudice and for partial summary 
judgment is GRANTED. 
2. Petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for neglecting to raise, on appeal, 
trial counsel's alleged failure to call witnesses who would have testified regarding petitioner's state 
of mind is DISMISSED without prejudice. 
3. Petitioner's remaining claims are DENIED. 
DATED this 1/h day of-: 
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1 standpoint of the defendant at that particular time but 
2 a reasonable person under those circumstances. And I 
I 3 submit again if you are looking for how a reasonable 
4 person acts, you got to look at what the three boys 
5 did. Yeah, they were stupid for going there. They 
6 were stupid for rushing a man who had a rifle. But at 
7 the point that matters, the time of the murder, what 
8 did they do9 They back off, they left, they had 
9 accomplished their mission They had no intent, no 
10 desire no motivation to try to shoot Darby. That's 
II what a reasonable person would have done. The 
12 Defendant was not acting as a reasonable person when he 
13 picked the rifle up and shot it six times. 
14 I am going to close, but I just want to say a 
15 couple of things m closing: One of the hardest things 
16 for me as a trial attorney m a murder case is the fact 
17 that there is no victim here. You never get to see the 
18 victim. We can't call him and put him up there. If 
19 this was an Attempted Murder, if this was an Aggravated 
20 Assault, we'd call the victim and he or she would take 
21 the stand and you'd get to see them, you'd get to know 
22 a little bit about them, what kind of person they are. 
23 In a Murder case we just can't do that. The person's 
24 gone 
25 We try to give you a little glimpse into the 
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1 life of Darby Golby (sic) We don't know for sure what 
2 kind of a man he was. We have heard a little bit here 
3 and there The Defense may want to talk about his 
4 earrings or whatever like that. But, whatever, he's a 
5 human being. He had a life. He had ambitions and 
6 dreams He had people who cared for him. And no one 
7 had the right to take that away from him. The ultimate 
8 disrespect, the ultimate violation of civil rights is 
i 9 to take a man's life and kill him and murder him, and 
10 that's what happened And no one, no one deserves 
11 that 
12 There's a couple of things that Mr — one 
13 thing that I think is important is what Mr Drury had 
14 to say Remember, he's the gentleman, the clerk at the 
15 7-Eleven who saw it and perhaps gave the most objective 
\\6 testimony of what happened that night. What did he 
17 say9 He talked about how the car pulled away and there 
18 were three shots and the car went another 45 feet or so 
19 and three more shots and that's the one that killed him 
20 and it crashed. And then because Mrs. Koontz wanted to 
21 know if that was her son or not, what did he do, he 
22 went down to the truck and he came around to the truck 
23 and opened the passenger side or the door and what did 
24 he say9 He said, "The first thing I saw was the blood. 
25 It was so soaked on those bench - on that bench that 
1 it was like a spray can, someone had sprayed it w ith 
2 paint. The body was on the floor, the face was down 
3 When he lifted it up by the collar, the blood just 
I 4 spurt out of that wound " Now, I bring that out for 
5 one simple reason, Ladies and Gentlemen, that's wh\ vvc 
6 are here, a man was murdered, he was violently 
7 murdered. That's what this is all about That's what 
8 this case is. He's not here. But we are here because 
9 he was murdered 
10 One last glimpse into Darby's life that I 
II think is kind of important for us. When these four men 
12 ran toward Darby to beat him up, he never used the 
13 rifle. He came to the fight with a rifle but never 
14 used it Now, some people may say, "Boy, that's 
15 stupid That's real stupid, you got a rifle and didn't 
16 use it." But may I suggest that it shows something 
17 else, it shows that of all of the people there, he was 
18 the only one that was concerned with not escalating a 
19 fight into something much more dangerously He's the 
20 only one that was concerned about that. He didn't fire 
21 that weapon, he didn't use that weapon as a club, he 
22 didn't even use it to defend himself. And, m fact, at 
23 one point what did he say? "Why are you here9" And at 
24 another point he said, "Take the rifle." He wanted 
25 nothing of this escalated violence. That's a glimpse 
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1 into who Darby Golub is 
2 We talk about guilt or innocence I like to 
3 talk about whether or not a person should be held 
4 responsible for what they did We've talked about it 
5 The evidence is clear That night Russell Bisner shot 
6 and killed and murdered Darby Golub That's what he is 
7 responsible for Don't let him off with some 
8 Manslaughter charge Don't give him some excuse that 
9 it was only Manslaughter Don't pamper him It is 
10 time he faced up He murdered a man that night He 
11 should be held responsible And then let the Judge 
12 decide what to do as far as the punishment But hold 
13 him responsible for what he did, the Murder and the 
14 Robbery of Darby Golub Thank you 
15 THE COURT All right 
16 Mr Dellapiana 
17 MR DELLAPIANA Good afternoon, Ladies and 
18 Gentlemen On behalf of my Co-counsel, Matt, and 
19 myself, I'd like to say that I'm pleased to be here 
20 today representing Russell in this matter I'm pleased 
21 to have an opportunity now to talk to you about the 
22 evidence And, as you know, there's two separate 
23 charges I would like to start with the easier one, 
24 the Aggravated Robbery or in this case the lack of 
25 Aggravated Robbery 
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i Now, there's three reasons that Td like you 
2 to consider as to why you should find for us not guilty 
3 of Aggravated Robbery. You heard that the Aggravated 
4 Robbery needs to be intentional and unlawful. First 
5 consider the evidence from all of the witnesses, that 
6 this did not have anything to do with a robbery I 
I 7 asked each of the witnesses, the witnesses 
8 individually, specifically, why they were going there 
9 and what was their intention, was there any intention 
10 to commit a robbery that night? Each and every one of 
II the witnesses that I asked about that said 
12 specifically, "No, that sort of thing never came up 
13 That never - it wasn't an issue." Why did they go? 
14 Because Darby had called them out and threatened their 
15 lives and called them out to meet them. This is, I 
16 think, an example of a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
17 analysis. Now, if you have all of the witnesses saying 
18 specifically that something occurred or didn't occur, 
19 then it's, if not impossible, I think at least 
20 unreasonable for you to determine the opposite. So, 
21 for that - that's the first reason I think you should 
22 find Russell not guilty of Aggravated Robbery. 
23 Second reason is: Aggravated Robbery needs 
24 to be - or the Robbery portion of the Aggravated 
25 Robbery, that's separate elements that the State needs 
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1 to show, but the Robbery needs to be unlawful, an 
2 unlawful stealing, for somebody unlawfully taking the 
3 property. Now, here's the question, isn't it - would 
4 any of you disagree that it would be perfectly proper, 
5 permissible, to disarm somebody who's threatened you 
6 with an assault weapon? 
7 Let's look at a couple of examples: Let's 
8 say that -- let's use the classic example of a robbery: 
9 A guy goes into a 7-Eleven, pulls out a gun, tells the 
10 clerk, "Give me your money," okay, well, there's a 
, 11 robbery But let's say that the clerk then manages to 
12 get the gun away from the robber, well, is the clerk 
13 guilty of robbery? Of course not. The person would be 
14 lawfully entitled to disarm a person under the 
15 circumstances 
\\6 Let's use another example that perhaps may 
17 fit more closely with this concept of a bunch of young 
18 guys getting — committing a fight. Let's have an 
19 example of two boxers get in a ring and a guy in red 
20 shorts, guy in blue shorts And they agree they are 
21 going to have a little fight Let's say the guy m the 
22 red shorts pulls a big gun out of his baggy shorts. He 
23 points it at the guy in the blue shorts Well, does 
24 the guy in the blue shorts have the right to disarm the 
25 guy in the red shorts? Well, certainly. Is he guilty 
I P d g e 
1 of Robbery for doing it? No 
2 Second reason that you should find Russell 
3 not guilty of Robbery is that taking a weapon under 
4 these circumstances was not unlawful 
; 5 Okay, there is a third reason I'd like you to 
6 consider to find Russell not guilty of the Aggra\ itcd 
7 Robbery and that has to do with the aggravating 
8 circumstances, and aggravating circumstances you ha\ 
9 to use the - use the weapon, for example, to commit 
10 the robbery. Actually, there is several factors You 
II should understand that the State has to prove both the 
12 robbery and aggravating factor. There can be asc ot a 
13 weapon, but if there wasn't a robbery, then there isn't 
14 an Aggravated Robbery It is kind of - maybe it is 
15 kind of confusing, the concept of Russell using Darby' 
16 gun to commit a robbery against Darby I mean, it's 
17 the sort of a thing that I think only a lawyer would 
18 think of. I think that's kind of an illogical thing 
19 and doesn't really fit with common sense and doesn't 
20 really fit with the circumstances in this case But, 
21 anyway, because there wasn't a Robbery, there can't be 
22 an Aggravated Robbery 
23 Now, maybe if the - maybe if the -- let's 
24 say the clerk in the 7-Eleven store some time later 
25 decided -- you know, got scared and took the gun that 
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1 he took away home - took the gun he took away from the 
2 7-Eleven - or from the robbery and took it home, in ay he 
3 that's tampering with evidence or something But 
4 because the taking was not unlawful, taking was 
5 permissible, it was not a robbery And that's what >ou 
6 have in this case 
7 I think that where all the witnesses say that 
8 this doesn't have anything to do with robbery, I gue^s, 
9 it had something to do with a fight but not robbery, 
10 where we have a situation where it is not unlawful to 
, 11 disarm this fellow who had threatened their Lives with 
112 an assault weapon and this question about aggravating 
13 factor, I would ask you to find Russell not guilty on 
14 that charge 
15 Okay, so let's get to the real deal, are we 
16 talking about a Murder or a Manslaughter? Was this a 
17 situation that was an extreme emotional -- that created 
18 an extreme emotional disturbance9 And just at the 
19 start here let me say that I believe that the 
20 instructions relate to whether a reasonable person in 
21 those circumstances would feel an extreme emotional 
22 disturbance And I think that that's what you need to 
23 focus on in deciding whether the circumstances of this 
24 case are of Murder or Manslaughter 
25 As you know, we have indicated from the 
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1 outset that there was never any doubt that Russell 
2 shot Darby, never denied it. The only question was, 
3 was it a Murder? I think it was not. 
4 Judge, I am going to need to get Exhibit No. 
5 18 
6 THE COURT Sure, help yourself 
7 MR DELLAPIANA I thought for a few seconds, 
I 8 and it just crossed my mind, that I do some sort of 
9 demonstration with you just to kind of see if we can do 
10 an example of whether circumstances that occurred that 
11 night would create an extreme emotional disturbance 
12 I'll promise I am not going to do it. What I was 
13 thinking for just a second is that I would grab the 
14 rifle in a way that it was described that Darby did and 
15 approach you and make sort of a threat or something, 
16 just to kind of try to get m you a mmd-set of instead 
17 of being in this comfortable jury room of where — 
18 instead to try to put yourself in the circumstances 
19 that existed that night, which is what you need to try 
20 to do But, even after a few seconds - I mean, it 
21 occurred to me that - struck me that that would be in 
22 bad taste. It would be perhaps frightening, just too 
23 uncivilized to do even in the courtroom where, you 
24 know, the gun is all tied up and it's — we have plenty 
25 of light, we have a secure facility of the bailiff back 
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1 here But even though lawyers have bad reputations, I 
2 know that you would not really take seriously that I 
3 was actually threatening you So what I am going to 
4 ask you to do is ~ I think what you have to do to 
5 consider whether what happened that night was ~ would 
j 6 create a reasonable -- create an extreme emotional 
7 disturbance in a reasonable person is to place yourself 
8 in the dark of night, 2 00 o'clock in the morning, 
9 empty parking lot, the lights at that part of the 
10 parking lot are not working It's - you show up and 
11 walk up to a person and, you know, as you are walking 
12 up to them, gets out of the car and at that point pulls 
13 a gun Nobody knew that Darby was bringing a gun up to 
14 that point It was a surprise to everybody It — 
15 there was screaming, yelling, angry, threatening things 
16 that - that I think nobody was able to desenbe after 
17 the fact You heard people, you heard the witnesses 
18 talk about — one of them said he had some sort of a 
19 brain — I forget what he said but - just from the 
20 adrenaline and fright he had just lost his mind, 
21 basically We have a person that's much -- of 
22 course - let me just stop for a minute and say I think 
23 that the - that the fact that Darby died was tragic, 
24 it's sad, needless I am positive that everybody in 
25 this courtroom, including Russ, feels that way But 
1 you need to get past that and put yourself in the 
2 situation to consider - to consider the issue that \ou 
3 need to consider And I'll talk about that some more 
4 Let me put this gun back. 
5 All right. Some of the other circumstances 
6 that showed up: I guess they expected this fight, but 
7 they had been threatened with death. I think one of 
8 the witnesses, or both of them, said that Darby had 
9 threatened to kill everybody. So, you know, m that 
10 very short time span as they walk up and have the 
11 threat and they see the gun and, you know, the hearts 
12 pounding, adrenaline is running through you, your 
13 mind's racing, thoughts to save yourself and save your 
14 friends and people you care about from a - and you arc 
15 looking at an army assault weapon m the hands of a 
16 drug-crazed person who has threatened your life, is 
17 there any question that that wouldn't be the most 
18 extreme emotional disturbance that anybody can possibly 
19 face? I really can't think of any except to think that 
20 maybe if my only daughter was in that situation, 
21 it's - it is frightening, and I think that is that -
22 that's what you need to try to put yourself into 
23 Another part of this is that there was never 
24 a cooling off period, okay. The extreme emotional 
25 disturbance happened, and what did witnesses say, 
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1 "Everything that happened after that happened within a 
2 few seconds." it is not like there's time to say, 
3 "Well, you know, I'm going to go home and think about 
4 this for a while and see if I'm really not afraid " 
5 The three of the - the three guys that walked away 
6 left Russ with - alone with this gun, who had just 
7 been in a fight, was certainly angry about that, I 
8 would think, still had the gun according to all the 
9 other witnesses not to mention this other thing on his 
10 hand, the weights on it, some sort of other weapon, and 
11 then within seconds -- and there is some discussion 
12 about, "Oh, it was, you know, 45 feet, you know" - I 
13 mean, let's look at this for a second. Where are 
14 those - where are those first bullet holes9 Here is 
15 the casings. Here's the bullet holes. If I can use 
116 something a little longer here. Okay, there is the 
17 casings, here is the bullet holes See these shots arc 
18 happening within -- well, actually before — m the 
19 diagram, before they even have where the truck 
20 supposedly starts - okay, here's, I guess, where they 
21 are trying to say the truck starts from, but here is 
22 the casings Here's -- here's where the first shots 
23 are fired, and that indicates that this is happening 
24 immediately. And if you recall what Dustin Symcs said 
25 at the - that was driving the truck that Russ came in, 
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1 he said the first shot started before he even saw 
2 Darby's truck starting to come around him. Some of the 
3 other witnesses talk about that, everything happened 
4 within one, two or three seconds. There's other people 
5 that talk about - the whole range, the whole thing 
6 occurred within one, two or three car lengths' of the 
7 truck's movement. That was the testimony Even John 
8 Drury, the guy that was up at the 7-Eleven, testified 
9 that the whole sequence of events, from where the truck 
10 started to when the truck got over here, was only about 
11 five seconds And a lot of that time - we don't know 
12 exactly what all of details are about that, but what we 
13 do know is that everything happened m a very short 
14 time span. There wasn't the time to cool off In fact 
15 - here's another question. Prosecutor was talking to 
16 you about whether there's - you know, he said, "Maybe 
17 the first three shots would be something that would be 
18 during an extreme emotional disturbance, maybe one, 
19 maybe two, maybe three " You recall the difference 
20 between the third shot and the fourth shot by John 
21 Drury's testimony, because there was some testimony 
22 that there was a slight break m between is - I think 
23 he said one and a half seconds. He thought to himself 
24 one and a half seconds. So where do we draw the line 
25 between an extreme emotional disturbance and not? 
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1 Where does it - is it the first, third bullet, fourth 
2 bullet9 There's not time. There needs to be more than 
3 one and a half seconds for you to say that a person m 
4 that circumstance facing an assault rifle and a threat 
5 of death can go from from acting in an extreme 
6 emotional disturbance -- which is only partial 
7 justification, but it's what happened m this case — 
8 to murder Is one and a half second enough for you to 
9 say - well, you know, sure he shouldn't have done it. 
10 Well, we admit that he shouldn't have done it. We 
11 always have The question is: Should it be Murder or 
12 Manslaughter9 One and a half seconds I submit to you 
13 is not enough for you to say that Russ ought to be 
14 convicted of Murder. Sure he ought to be punished for 
15 what he did, and we hope that you'll take all of that 
16 into account in deciding what's appropriate. 
17 I want to talk about some of the evidence and 
18 in a little more detail. There's some emphasis by the 
19 State on the testimony of Chris Lyman. You remember, 
20 he was that little liar that sat up here. He was the 
21 guy that - the LSD dealer, the drug dealer. And if 
22 you recall, he's the guy who made I think - h e ' s still 
23 trying to deny it. But made a deal to stay out of jail 
24 by giving some testimony, by making a statement to 
125 police which he repeated here in court. I want you to 
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1 compare what he said with what the witnesses who wL 
2 there at the scene. Of course, he's saying -- he's 
3 talking about - Chris is talking about something -
4 he's alleging that somebody who he vaguely knows sai 
5 something -- as he's just kind of leaving his hou^c, he 
! 6 sort of said, "Yeah, that Darby somebody is going to 
7 die " And, you know, he wasn't there to know what 
8 actually happened But that's not the main problem 
9 with his testimony The main problem with his 
10 testimony was his candor, credibility, his 
11 truthfulness Remember how hard it was for me to get 
12 him to admit that he had got a break on his jail time 
13 I said, "Didn't you get a deal for this - giving this 
14 statement9" "Why, no No, I did not" I mean, it is 
15 a good thing I had some — I was able to dig up some 
16 details on it to get him to finally admit that it was 
17 an understanding he had with Van Midgley, the city 
18 prosecutor, that he understood that he was to get -
19 that he had to get some information and that - in 
20 fact, how did he say that9 I'm trying to remember 
21 Something about if he didn't get the information, he'd 
22 still be screwed. And then I had the information 
23 that - that he actually did get eight days, and he 
24 said, "And something else," which I couldn't get him tc 
25 explain what's that something else But he - he lied 
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1 about that, and he tried to avoid responsibility for 
2 for the something else, denied that it was part of any 
3 deal, plus, if you recall, there was evidence that this 
4 deal was intentionally kept secret All right 
5 Remember, as we are going through the transcript, the 
6 part where he's reading or I 'm reading, we are going 
7 through and it says, "I can't promise you anything 
8 wink, wink, because it will look bad m court It will 
9 look bad. It looks bad in court. They will think the 
10 deal was made for you to talk and you could have made 
11 it up " Well, then he lied about it And what 
12 happened? We know he lied because finally he admittc 
13 "Yeah, the --1 can't remember whether it was the 
14 detective or the prosecutor went and talked to the 
15 judge." You remember he was kind of confused about 
16 that, that somebody talked to prosecutor about that or 
17 the judge. "Some time off your sentence9" "Well, 
18 yeah. Yeah, I guess I did." 
19 You know, you have an instruction that sa>s 
20 when you consider the bias of witnesses, that you can 
21 disregard entirely the testimony of any witness that 
22 you find testifies falsely or has special interest or 
23 bias m the case. And you should disregard Chris 
24 Lyman's testimony because he lied; also because his 
25 testimony is so different from the people who were 
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1 there and people who, yes, have -- who have accepted 
2 responsibility to some extent for their actions You 
3 recall specifically I asked - I asked Dustin Symes, I 
4 said - because you remember what Chris Lyman was 
5 testifying about was -- he claimed that Russ had some 
6 sort of a debt that he was going to -- he didn't --
7 actually, let's be clear, he didn't say that - he 
8 didn't say that Russ said that Russ was going to kill 
J 9 anybody He didn't say Russ was going to kill anybody 
10 He didn't say who was going to die. He didn't say 
11 anybody was going to die, like, tonight or anything 
12 like that. But even the hint he made was that it was 
13 about a debt. But you remember the people who were 
14 there Dustin and Derek. In fact, let's go to Derek 
15 first. Derek was with Russ all evening, and Derek 
16 Pearson and Russ apparently did go over to this guy's 
17 house So Derek was with him all night. And I asked 
18 Derek specifically, and I think - you know, you heard 
19 Derek's testimony I think he came across as a fairly 
20 credible young man. And Derek indicated, no, this had 
21 nothing to do with any debt Derek was aware of the 
22 debt, but Derek specifically said, "No, Russ didn't 
23 even seem to care about it." He was never angry about 
24 it, never made any threats over it, didn't even come up 
25 that night 
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1 In fact, that night didn't seem really to 
2 have that much to do with Russ at all. If you recall 
3 back at Justin's house, sure, the phone was being 
4 passed around, but ultimately it was Dustin who said — 
5 who was arguing with Darby and said -- you know and 
6 they were talking trash back and forth. Finally hung 
7 up and said to all of the other guys, "Let's go." So 
I 8 it wasn't Russ who started this problem. 
9 When they got to the 7-Eleven, you recall 
10 John Drury said - let's see, Derek was out front 
11 talking with Russ Justin out m front having a 
12 conversation about general stuff. And we have 
13 information that Justin ran out of the - dropped his 
14 nachos and ran out of the store, angry, ready for a 
15 fight You know, Russ was just standing there having a 
16 chat And they got down there. And if you recall the 
17 testimony, Dustin goes up, pops the guy in the head 
18 with the bat Derek and Justin are throwing fists 
19 They don't even see Russ. Russ isn't even involved m 
20 this thing until suddenly they back away from him, 
21 leave Russ there alone with this - with this guy who's 
22 threatened their lives and who brought a gun. You 
23 know, I don't see what's reasonable - really - one 
24 thing that really bothered me about this ~ the State's 
25 opening, they tried to twist it completely around How 
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1 is it that Darby is the one who's acting reasonably) 
2 If Russ and his friends had intended harm, I mean, the 
3 harm of the sort that's being charged here today, they 
4 would have been the ones that took the gun. They 
5 talked about it, apparently. "Maybe we should take 
6 some weapons, naw," because that's not what it was 
7 about at least from their point of view Darby's the 
8 one who brought it Darby is the one that brought the 
9 only weapon, brandished it, threatened with it None 
10 of this would have happen without Darby He's the 
11 instigator of this thing. 
12 Dustin also testified that this never had 
13 anything to do with any debt that might have been owed 
14 for Russ But let's assume that just a minute, that it 
15 was about a debt There is no evidence --1 mean, the 
16 evidence - the eyewitness — the evidence - the 
17 testimony of the eyewitnesses is completely to the 
18 contrary. I mean, that would not be a bright thing to 
19 do. That wouldn't be the right to thing to do But it 
20 would be - a fist fight, you know, not a murder that 
21 was intended. 
22 THE COURT Two minutes, Mr Dellapiana. 
23 MR DELLAPIANA Okay. 
24 Let's talk briefly about -
25 Judge, I wonder if you'd give me a little bit 
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1 more time if I promised to try to speed up a little 
2 bit? 
3 Well, here we go. 
4 Actually, I have quite a few additional 
5 things There is a lot of details m the evidence, 
6 some of what is conflicting, some is undisputed For 
7 example, there is a statement right at the beginning of 
8 this case that Russell phoned Darby and left a 
9 threatening message. There is no evidence of that I 
10 asked specifically - specifically asked Derek, I said, 
11 "Derek" -- because he kind of said, "Well, I kind of 
12 got the impression that somebody left a message, ma>be 
13 it was Russ " He didn't see anything like that He 
14 didn't hear anything like that I mean, my dad always 
15 told me, "Don't believe — or don't believe anything 
16 you hear and only half of what you see. And Derek 
117 didn't see or hear anything in this case 
18 There is a lot of statements that were made 
19 Most of the witnesses stated that they didn't - they 
20 didn't really remember what they were saying I know 
21 that Justin Koontz, for example, said something 
22 about -- today said something about take the gun, 
23 something about that he heard Russell cock the gun 
24 This is the first time that we ever heard anything like 
25 that from him. 
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1 MR STOTT Your Honor, I would object to 
2 that That is not the state of the evidence 
3 THE COURT Well, the Jury will remember 
4 having now heard two days' worth of evidence what it 
5 was And I told them this is simply argument This is 
6 Counsel's interpretation They are to rely on their 
7 own judgment as to what the evidence actually showed 
8 MR DELLAPIANA That's correct, Your Honor I 
9 Thank you, Your Honor 
10 Back m his first day when he said, I think 
11 on cross-examination, this was read into the record 
12 "I was walking away, so I really didn't see anything 
13 Then I heard gunshots And Darby was driving off And 
14 that's all I saw I got scared We got m the truck 
15 and ran," which kind of disputes this concept of, "Oh, 
16 the fight was over, everything was fine " He was 
17 scared He got m the truck He ran That was his 
18 testimony And I appreciate the Judge for reminding me 
19 that what Mr Stott said isn't evidence You need to 
20 remember the actual evidence when you take into 
21 consideration what happened and what the circumstances 
22 were there that night 
23 In terms of whether his flight from the scene 
24 was evidence of quilt, as we've indicated a couple of 
25 times, he's never denied what he did, the only question 
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1 is what is fair, what's fair for him to take 
2 responsibility for under these circumstances? 
3 There is some other details about the -
4 about the question of ability of the witnesses to 
5 observe the details There is some questions about the 
6 details of what actually happened I mean, it was 
7 dark Dustm, do you remember, he said he had bad 
8 eyesight After popping Darby in the head, he said he 
9 turned around and went back to the truck, didn't really 
10 see anything after that Justin, remember, he didn't 
11 see the gun, he didn't see Russ, he didn't see Darby or 
12 Derek had a bat Derek, of course, was on 
13 hallucinogens So some of the details here I think you 
14 need to take into account are not really clear as to 
15 what exactly happened 
16 The only real undisputed things are that 
17 Darby called these guys up, threatened to kill them, 
18 called them out to the parking lot, brought a gun 
19 unbeknownst to them and brandished it when he got out 
20 of the vehicle 
21 Finally, in regards to the reasonable doubt 
22 question that Counsel was reading about, what the 
23 standards are, we'll briefly describe for comparison 
124 sake there is three major standards of proof in court 
25 cases One is preponderance of the evidence That's 
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1 about - generally considered on a scale to be about S( 
2 percent It is a sort of a case like in a contract 
3 case, a contract dispute on - did the contractor agree 
! 4 to build me a 20 foot concrete platform for my patio c 
5 was it 30 feet, that sort of thing, and the e\ ldcnce is 
6 about - it's - it's whichever one has a little bit 
7 more evidence than the other If you apply that to the 
8 evidence in this case -- if you find yourself on some 
9 point that you say, "You know, we really don't know 
10 It is about 50/50 There is evidence both ways It is 
11 hard to decide," that would be somewhere around the 
12 preponderance standard And if you were to find 
13 yourself in that position, you would be required to 
14 find Russ not guilty on that point 
15 There is another standard of clear and 
16 convincing evidence This is a standard that would 
17 apply if, for example, you were to - the State *vas 
18 trying to take the kids away from you, all right, 
19 trying to do a parental termination, they'd have to 
20 prove by clear and convincing evidence you are an unfi 
21 parent before they could take your kids away from you 
22 Now that's a pretty high standard because the State 
23 doesn't want to be taking kids away from their parents 
24 Beyond a reasonable doubt standard is even higher than 
25 that, and it has to be — you know, I 'm going to say 
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1 this because Mr Stott indicated it is not 100 percenl 
2 There is — there has been a statement m a court case 
3 that it is approximately 99 percent You have to be 
4 very, very sure as to what to do before you find 
5 somebody guilty There's a particular — there s a 
6 particular — one particular — oh, let's see, one 
7 particular thing I want to argue, that it there is a 
8 question about which of the two offenses that you 
9 should find on - and in regards to the Murder charge, 
10 you have Murder and you have Manslaughter - you need 
111 to — I mean, if there is a reasonable doubt as to 
12 which applies, you are required to find only the 
13 lesser I mean, if there is evidence both ways and you 
14 say, "Well, there is some evidence that he shot him, 
15 he's admitted that But, yeah, it seems like a 
16 reasonable person under those circumstances would Ix in 
17 a situation where they would reasonably feel an extreme 
18 emotional disturbance for which there is a good reason 
19 a good reason being Darby brought out an assault weapon 
20 and threatened your life with it" I mean, if there LS 
21a reasonable question as to which of those applies you 
22 have to go with the Manslaughter 
23 Just as ~ just as m our society we hope 
24 that, you know, things like deaths like this don't 
25 occur, and that that's a bad thing and it is a thing 
rACCMA oninnnTii 
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1 that we need to deal with as a society and use you as 
2 jurors, need to take that into account, the same way in 
3 our society we don't want to convict people unfairly of 
4 criminal charges, especially when we are talking about 
5 Murder. And for that reason I would ask you to give 
6 this young man what he deserves, what he deserves is 
7 the Manslaughter charge. Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 Mr. Stott. 
10 MR. STOTT. Thank you. 
11 I won't be long, just an opportunity to 
12 respond to some of the comments made by Defense. As 
13 far as the Aggravated Robbery, he tells us that it was 
14 not intentional. Well, again, look at the 
15 instructions. There is nothing in the instructions 
16 that require us to prove that this was an intentional 
17 robbery, nothing that requires us to prove that they 
18 went there with the intent to rob. We have to show an 
19 intentional taking, that's all we have to show. And 
20 certainly there was an intentional taking. Now, 
21 somehow Mr. Dellapiana believes that if you can — what 
22 was the word — disarm someone, that's okay. Well, 
23 this is not a case of disarming, this is not like a 
24 7-Eleven clerk, a 7-Eleven clerk who disarms someone 
25 who's trying to rob him. They give the gun to the 
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1 police officer. They don't take it home and hide it. 
2 That's the taking, the taking home and hiding it. And 
3 that's what Mr. Bisner did here. He took the gun home. 
4 That's an unlawful taking. And he hid it. And that's 
5 it. 
6 He talks about the extreme emotional 
7 disturbance at the time these four got out of the truck 
8 and saw Darby 30 or 20 feet away with a rifle. Well, 
9 again, as I talked about before, there is no evidence 
10 that they were suffering from extreme emotional 
11 disturbance, none of them; especially absolutely no 
12 evidence as to what Mr. Bisner was suffering under. In 
13 fact, we know that they didn't have that fear because 
14 what did they do, they charged him, they didn't turn 
15 around. But that's not important. Frankly, the key 
16 here is ~ I think we can all understand the key is 
17 what about at the time of the shooting? Was Mr. Bisner 
18 under extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the 
19 shooting? Well, how can he be? Darby didn't have the 
20 rifle He had been beat up, he had been hit with a 
21 bat, he had been hit with a fist, he was trying to get 
22 away. He gave the rifle to him. He said, "Take it." 
23 And he was 45 feet away when Mr. Bisner when started to 
24 fire. Under those circumstances how could he claim 
25 extreme emotional disturbance? Talks about they were 
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1 under a threat to kill. Well, the threat to kill was 
2 given over a phonecall 30 minutes earlier. And, 
3 obviously, if that caused extreme emotional 
j 4 disturbance, you stay home, you don't go down to the 
5 parking lot. This threat to kill had absolutely no 
6 relevance to extreme emotional disturbance. 
7 Drug crazed. Well, he tells us that 
8 Mr. Lyman - that the Defendant -- excuse me, Mr Golub 
9 was drug crazed. Is there any evidence of that? Now, 
10 come on? Come on, now. What evidence of that9 Who 
11 was crazed that night? Four men who charged a guy with 
12 a rifle or the one who had the rifle and didn't do 
13 anything, absolutely no aggression on his part 
14 whatsoever. Who was crazed, the ones who knocked him 
15 over the head with a bat and hit him or the one that 
16 didn't do anything? Who was crazed? The one who said, 
17 "What are you doing this for? Take it." And then 
18 tried to leave. Or the one who picked up the rifle, 
19 cocked it and shot six times at another individual who 
20 was fleeing? Now who was crazed? Certainly, it wasn't 
21 Darby Golub. 
22 He says that Dustin Symes testified that he 
23 heard a shot and then saw Mr. Golub's truck. That's 
24 not what he testified to. You'll have the memory of 
25 that. But what he testified to was he heard the shots 
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1 at the same time he saw Mr. Golub's truck coming 
2 around, at the same time. He thinks somehow that this 
3 whole thing occurred very rapidly and so that means 
4 that it was Manslaughter. Well, it did occur rapidly, 
5 but, again - and I think that's why this diagram is so 
6 important, we can see how this occurred and especially 
7 in relationship to John Drury's testimony. We are 
8 talking about 45 feet away here where the first shot 
9 occurred because the glass is here. The first shot was 
10 not effective, and so I he went - excuse me, here is 
11 the first shot. And he went another - it is 65 feet 
12 to here. And he went another 45 feet, and there was 
13 more shots. Why? Because the first shots weren't 
14 successful. The last shot was successful. And he 
15 didn't have to shoot anymore. Because what did 
16 Mr. Drury say? That was the time when he could tell 
17 that something had happened. 
118 Talks about Chris Lyman. I don't know what 
19 to make of it. Mr. Lyman testified. You heard his 
20 testimony. He said, no, he wasn't given any promise. 
21 The main thing he did -- okay, there is something about 
22 the city prosecutor or judge in Sandy, but absolutely 
23 nothing to do with us, the people involved in this 
24 case. In fact, he said - you read the - the Defense 
25 had him read a transcript from Mr. Peterson's intcn icw 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RUSSELL E. BISNER, 
Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 20030624-CA 
Appellant's Opening Brief 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(2), (3)(i)(j), 
and will require review of the court's decision of direct appeal decision on November 20, 
2001 in case no. 20000026-SC in light of new facts and evidence. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: The habeas court erred in dismissing the petition. Standard of review is 
giving no deference to the lower court's conclusions of law but review them for 
correctness. See Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah 1998) 
Issue A: The Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on 
first appeal of right. These claims present mixed questions of fact and law which 
generally get reviewed de novo. See Banks v. Reynolds. 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
Issue B: The prosecution in its failure to disclose requested and unrequested 
Brady, Agurs and Bagley materials and or lied about availability or presence violated due 
process and deprived me of a fair trial. This issue also presents a mixed question of law 
and fact thus is reviewed de novo. See Banks, id. atl516. 
ISSUE 2: The court committed plain and rule 30(a) error in appointing counsel for 
appeal that was recommended by counsel who initiated conflict issues without holding a 
conflict hearing. Review is under plain error and exceptional circumstances. Dunn, supra 
and State v Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
ISSUE 3: The trial, appeal and habeas proceedings were replete with many 
instances of plain rule 30(a) and prejudicial error as well as cumulative error, resulting in 
a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Review would be correction of error under Julian, 
supra but would also involve interpretation of a statute which is a legal conclusion 
reviewed for correctness; State v. Lusk, 37 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Utah 2001), and involves 
legal conclusions giving no deference to the court's conclusions. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 
930, 933 (Utah 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
All determinative provisions will be set forth in the body of the brief or addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/RELEVANT FACTS 
On January 11, 1999 appellant was charged with murder and aggravated robbery. 
There were two discovery requests on February 22, 1999 and May 10, 1999. Several 
procedural motions were filed, all of which were denied. On October 1, 1999 the court 
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sentenced me to two 5-year to life terms with a 1-year firearm enhancement, all running 
consecutively. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial filed on November 23, 
1999. 
An appeal before the Utah Supreme Court ensued being denied on November 20, 
2001, case no. 20000026. (See exhibit 1. Procedural history therein is correct.) 
Petition for Extra Ordinary Relief was filed. After a morass of paperwork the 
petition was denied on January 1, 2003 without hearing. (See exhibit 2: final order of 
dismissal). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In a pro se action the liberal construction doctrine under Haines v. Kerner, 404 
U.S. 519, 20 (1972) mandates that if a cause of action can be read into a pro se pleading, 
the reviewing court must do so. 
In this case there are many structural defects described in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619, 623, 629-30 (1993) where when these defects are obvious relief must be 
granted based on the injurious and substantial effect or influence on the jury's verdict 
standard announced therein. The issues presented herein should have had Judge 
Fredericks in "grave doubt" or "so evenly balanced as being in a virtual equipoise" he 
should have found in my favor. See Oneal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1995). 
The issues of ineffective trial and appellate counsel under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Banks v. 
Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1995) and the issues involving prosecution misconduct 
3 
under Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 
(1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley. 115 S.Ct. 1555 
(1995); Banks, id- 1516-1522, and their progeny. The judge, if he had fundamental 
fairness in mind 4as well as protecting my fundamental inalienable rights, should have 
granted relief. He, because of the factual and legal dispute, should have at least ordered 
an evidentiary hearing but probably didn't because his Trial Court and judgment was at 
issue. There is no other conclusion that can be drawn. 
The lies, suppression of exculpatory evidence, proof of ineffective counsel and his 
bias and prejudice was all uncovered and evident in the record. 
The Supreme Court has clearly stated summary judgment is not proper in verified 
proceedings. Pentacost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985); Draper City v. Estate 
Bernada, 888 P.2d 1907 (Utah 1995), and I showed that there were genuine issues for a 
new trial by alleging facts making it unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction 
because had this evidence been discovered and/or available at trial a different result 
would be, and the Jury's verdict would be undermined. Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 599 
(Utah App. 1993); Casida v. Deland, 866 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1993); Hurst v. Cook, 866 
P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1989). The court erred in granting on this issue. 
Dismissal is not proper because the presented issues were questions of law and 
fact, Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1980), and I alleged and proffered factual 
data in support of my claims. Andrews v. Morris, 608 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980). The court 
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abused its discretion in denying relief and ordering the case dismissed, because in a 
proper forum I should have been granted relief on my proven facts. 
The Supreme Court stated in Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) that 
when a court grants relief it does so on the 5ground that the petitioner has been wrongfully 
incarcerated, that is to say that a "court SHOULD GRANT RELIEF if the petitioner 
establishes that he or she has been deprived of due process of law" or that "it would be 
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction." Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 969 
(Utah 1968). 
If the district court and habeas court concluded I had a fair trial and the process 
due under both state and federal due process and effective assistance of counsel clauses, 
then I guess it must be that Utah courts are right and thousands of other courts including 
opinions of Utah courts are wrong thus effectively spitting in all other courts faces 
including the district court's own face. 
The conviction and past review of it are contrary to the rudimentary principles of 
justice constituting a fundamental miscarriage of justice because the state does not have a 
strong case when the full facts are properly considered. Kyles at 429. See Kenney v. 
Tamavo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 12 (1992). 
Under Julian and Brown the petition should have been granted and a new trial 
ordered. See Walker and Kyles, supra. 
I have effectively proven that the state has "tinkered" with the fact finding process 
and the entire integrity of the system, continued this on direct appeal, and in the habeas 
5 
proceeding and will probably do so again now. The court should reverse the district court 
6denial of the petition and remand with instructions to hold the necessary hearings and 
grant appropriate relief or grant an outright reversal and order a new trial. 
ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT 1: "The district (habeas) court erred in dismissing the petition." 
Based on the preceding Summary of Argument, under Julian, id. 257 and Brown at 969; 
see supra brief at pages 3-65 the court erred in granting partial summary judgment and 
dismissal of the facts verified in the 65 C petition because of the constitutional violations 
alleged and proven herein and in the record. 
This argument will be furthered and referenced to as we proceed with this brief in 
the different sub-arguments. 
Sub-Argument A: "The petitioner was denied effective assistance of trial and 
appellate counsel and improperly denied counsel on his habeas case." Because of the 
conflict of interest in this case, see State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994), and of 
both trial and appellate counsels' lack of willingness to identify with my case, as this 
court said in State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah App. 1997), was a fundamental concept 
in representation which involves the fundamental fairness of a proceeding. I need to 
explain my disclosure issue of Argument B in the concept of my counsel argument 
because they go hand in hand with each other and are hard to separate because both in 
combination are inherently responsible for the compromising of my rights. 
6 
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Sub-Argument B: "The prosecution erred in its failure to disclose requested and 
unrequested Brady, Agurs and Bagley materials and/or lied of their presence which 
denied the appellant of due process and a fair trial." 
The main question here is did the omitted evidence create a reasonable doubt as to 
guilt, prejudice the defense and result in the denial of a fair trial? The answer is most 
emphatically yes, when combined and even standing independent from the other claims 
raised herein. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981) very clear 
in the habeas case of Willie Mae Walker where the same sort of prosecution misconduct 
seriously interfered with the trial court's truth seeking process and function. Id. 691. This 
combined with other acts of misconduct created the same unjust miscarriage of justice 
here, affecting the Judgment of the jury. 
Further, does the materiality of, versus absence of, evidence omitted based on the 
misconduct have an injurious or substantial effect of influence in determining the Jury's 
verdict? See Brecht id. 623. Yes, because [of] the withheld evidence the prosecution's 
case seemed much stronger and my case much weaker than the full facts suggested. 
Kyles, id. 429. 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court (The Court) decision in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 
U.S. 103 (1935), the rule has been that where the state knowingly uses perjured 
testimony, such a "contrivance by the state to procure the conviction" is inconsistent with 
justice. Id. at 112-13. Courts have therefore assumed that "if it is established that the 
7 
government knowingly permitted the introduction of false testimony 'reversal is virtually 
automatic5." See United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2nd Cir. 1991). 
In a series of cases prior to Brady involving either perjured testimony or 
prosecutorial suppression of evidence that would have demonstrated the falsity of trial 
testimony The Court sought to maintain the integrity of the process. For example, in 
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957) a prosecutor instructed a witness to withhold 
evidence about his relationship with the decedent resulting in a mistaken impression of 
the nature of the accused's participation in the crime. The instruction was deemed 
significant to the integrity of the proceeding and the acceptability of the result. Similarly 
in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942) the court held a habeas petitioner was 
entitled to his freedom because the conviction was obtained by the State's knowing use of 
perjured testimony. 
After Brady in United States v. Agurs, supra at 104, The Court observed that it had 
consistently held that a conviction obtained by the use of perjured likelihood the false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury, testimony was fundamentally 
unfair and must be set aside if there is any reasonable 
In Nix v.Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986) The Court declared that a lawyer 
who presents perjury on behalf of a defendant commits an illegal act. The Nix court 
noted that the canonical ethics of the bar and the model code of professional 
responsibility impose on ALL lawyers the duty to prevent and disclose frauds. More 
recently with respect to prosecutors the Ninth Circuit put the point brief and clear, 
8 
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"a prosecutor has a duty (special duty) commensurate with a prosecutor's unique power 
to assure that defendants receive fair trials." United States v. Lapage, 231 F.3d 488, 492 
(9th Cir. 2000). See Walker, supra at 691-92. Such has not happened here. 
Also recently, a prosecutor put before the jury testimony of an accomplice against 
a defendant without disclosing to the defense the existence of a letter implementing the 
accomplice and others in a plot to frame the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Bowie, 
243 F3d 1109-1111-1114 (9th Cir. 2001). The court concluded that the Government's 
failure to discover the origin of the letter aided in the commission if a FRAUD on the 
trial process. (Such is the case here with the plea bargains of the accomplices and with the 
existence of GSR reports and results.) As reflecting on the realities of the court system the 
Ninth Circuit correctly noted "each contract for testimony by a [government witness] is 
fraught with the real peril that the professed testimony will not be truthful but simply 
factually contrived to "get" a target of sufficient interest to induce concessions from the 
government. Id. 1124. In reversing the conviction the court said that recent studies have 
demonstrated that in about 1 out of 5 cases involving DNA exonerated defendants, the 
defendants had been inculpated by an accomplice's or informant's testimony. Id. 1124 
n.6. Thus, there is a lengthy history of judicial intolerance for a governmental "tinkering" 
with the integrity of the process through the introduction of false, contrived, or 
misleading evidence. 
10When prosecutors fail to disclose such information they compromise the integrity 
of the proceedings; viz, the fact finding process at trial and review by a higher court 
9 
(such as in this case in case #20000026). There are times when prosecutors forget or 
ignore the ethics of his office out of their desperation to convict, and fail to disclose 
Brady, Blake, Kyles, Aqurs material, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n. 25 (1976). 
There are also (like this case with the decedent's past) (the plea agreements as well as 
GSR information) times when a prosecutor will seek to win a case by 
intentionally hiding material impeachment evidence from defense counsel (rendering him 
ineffective.) 
In the case of Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4 (4th Cir. 1979), by intentionally 
concealing impeachment evidence described by Gigilio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972) a prosecutor negotiated a deal with the accomplice that was kept secret from the 
defense. In exchange for the testimony the accomplice would receive a reduced prison 
term. In testifying the accomplice denied any deal and exclaimed he was just doing his 
"civic duty" (as is this case). The Fourth Circuit granted Campbell's habeas petition 
holding that the prosecutor's failure to correct the accomplice's "unwittingly false 
testimony" violated due process. See id. at 7. 
But, sadly enough, such prosecutorial misconduct continues despite appellate court 
decisions such as these. In Singh v. Prunty, 142 F.3d 1157 (9 Cir. 1998) for example, the 
prosecutor kept from the defense information regarding benefits conferred on its major 
witness (such as this case). In United States v. Koiayan, 8 F.3d n1315 (9th Cir. 1993) the 
court reversed a conviction because the appellant proved the U.S. Attorney concealed 
10 
Brady information on a cooperation agreement with a material witness/informant and 
continued to scheme on appeal. ( Sounds familiar don't it? See #20000026, exhibit 1.) 
Similarly our Tenth Circuit stays consistent with the other circuits and the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Banks v. Reynolds, supra, id- at 1516-1522, particularly id. 1517 where 
the court explains as should be noted in this case, "that the prosecutors obligation to turn 
over the evidence in the first instance stands independent of the defendant's knowledge" 
(citations omitted). This goes to the heart of appellant's prior appeal and trial in concert 
with the proper presentation of the case now and its additional issue of ineffective trial 
and appellate counsel. This court must examine the merits of the omitted issues when the 
habeas petitioner alleges ineffective appellate counsel and his failure to raise the issues 
and [in] this case the conflict of interest posed as presented. See Banks, id. 1515. 
This court must be guided by the statement made in Aqurs, 427 U.S. at 10-11 that 
there are situations in which the evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the 
defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without specific request. 
It also must be further noted a prosecutor can delegate the duty to search for impeachment 
material. See United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488-1491-92 and n.3 (9th cir. (1992); 
Walker, 690, 91 (citations omitted). 12Objective viewing of the government in fact 
withholding information of the victims violent past effectively eliminated my self defense 
theory (as well) (as) (attacking the Winship requirement of being found guilty of every 
fact necessary to constitute the offense), the offense element as well since the self 
defense/lack of intent defense was corroborated by documentary proof of the victim's 
11 
violent acts prior to his death even though I've never seen the documents as well as by 
testimony of the decedent's own wife, family and friends. United States v. James, 169 
F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (9th cir 1999); Banks, supra similar and Medina v. Barnes, 71 F.3d 
363 (10th cir 1995); Stouffer v. Reynolds, 214 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Knoll, 
712P. 2d 211,214 (Utah 1985) (declaring that when evidence is produced by prosecution 
or defense which would provide some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a 
killing was done to protect the defendant from an imminent threat of death by another an 
instruction on self defense should be given the jury.) The simple evidence the decedent 
came there, pulled the assault rifle on the defendant and the defendant disarmed him in 
combat conclusively provided the "basis in evidence for the theory." Knoll, id. 214. This 
was admitted by prosecution as well as defense counsels. See UCA § 76-2-402 (1999). 
This evidence was obviously of substantial value to the defense, elementary 
fairness required it to be disclosed even without a specific request; Aqurs, 110-11; Kyles, 
supra at 429 and had a substantial and injurious effect 13on the jury's verdict. Brecht, id. 
623; Kyles, 435, A prudent prosecutor will resolve all doubts in favor of disclosure; 
Kyles, at 439, Aqurs, at 108 as echoing The Court "this is how it should be." Kyles, id. 
Other evidence conclusive of the self defense/lack of intent issue which was 
know[n] by prosecution and defense counsel, withheld by prosecution, not used in 
investigation or preparation of defense or not raised on first appeal as presented in 
argument 2 are as follows: 
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From officer Webb; (chain was in victim's hand); 
A. Item #21, 31" chain victim had (package 196-21) 
B. Item #21, picture #15, picture of victims 31" chain 
C. Item #22, package (pkg) 196-22, syringe found on victim 
D. Item #26, pkg. 196-26, GSR kit taken from victim (see exhibit 3) 
From Officer Hanes; 
E. Item #3, pkg. 174-3, GSR kit from Timothy Thornblad 
F. Item #4, pkg. 174-4, GSR kit from Justin Koontz 
G. Item #5, pkg. 174-5, GSR kit from Dustin Symes 
H. Item #6, pkg. 174-6, GSR kit from Derrick Pearson 
From officer May; (photos in photo log); 
I. Roll #2, photos #15, #16 of syringe on ground by victim's door 
J. Roll #2, photos 19-21, syringe and copper jacket on victim's dashboard 
K. Roll #4, photo 18, rounds on victim's driver-side floorboard 
L. Roll #4, photo 19, rounds in victim's driver's door pocket 
M. Roll #7, photos 17-18, guns in gun rack (victim) 
N. Roll #7, photos 22-23 of shotgun and SKS rifle (victim) 
O. Roll # , photo 24, plastic tube on floor between victim's seats 
P. Item #32, pkg. 188-27, bullet jacket found in victim's vehicle 
Q. Item #33, pkg. 188-28, syringe on floorboard - victim's vehicle 
R. Item #34, pkg. 188-29, syringe on dashboard of victim's vehicle 
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S. Item #35, pkg. 188-30, syringe on ground outside victim's driver's door 
T. Item #57, pkg. 188-52, rubber hose - victims vehicle 
U. Item #58, pkg. 188-53, unknown black substance - victim - 27 grams. 
V. 14Item #59, pkg. 188-54, victim's vehicle - pipe, glass (dope) 
W. Item #60, pkg. 188-55, victim - pipe (metal) 
X. Item #61, pkg. 188-56, bullets -victim's vehicle floorboard 7.62 x 39 (2) 
Y. Item #64, pkg. 188-59, syringe in black case - driver's side floorboard of 
victims vehicle 
Z. Item #65, pkg. 188-60, bullets (5) 7.62x39 - driver's side pocket of victims 
vehicle 
AA.Item #67, pkg. 188-62, film, 10 rolls of crime scene from Officer Williams 
(recovered from victim) 
BB. Item#GWl, pkg. GW1, rifle magazine possibly SKS 
CC. Item#GW3, pkg. GW2, plastic pumpkin containing empty syringe bags (2) 
and (2) empty ammo boxes 7.62x39. 
Now, the syringes, paraphernalia, etc. establish his drug abuse, a toxicology report 
at the time of autopsy would have proved some form of ingestion, illegal substances being 
found on victim prove illicit drug abuse which, all this, including the fact he came to the 
place where I was with the intent to harm me which is evidenced by; 
A. Possession of the 31" chain, 
B. Possession of the Assault rifle. 
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If he had no intent to harm me then why did he have the weapons and choose to 
come after me. This is proven. My only intent was to defend my life because it was 
threatened. I Possessed NO weapon. 
Further the drug abuse severely hyped his state of mind because he was a maniac. 
Look at what was found in HIS vehicle. He was not the outstanding citizen the State 
attempted to make him out to be. The photo they showed to the jury 15of him was a photo 
taken of him in military school. What is military school? This evidence was exculpatory 
in nature because it proved his intent to harm me and proved my intent to self-defense, to 
not let him kill me. 
The evidence proved his, all but, squeaky clean nature, disposition, position in 
community and most emphatically impeached is innocence. He was NOT an innocent 
victim as portrayed by the State and this is evidenced by Officer James' January 8, 1999 
interview with his wife Natalie Gulob concerning the violent nature of her husband, and 
to establish he carried weapons with him at ALL TIMES and this too was NEVER 
submitted. 
Now, the assignment of this error to a single entity is hard because it is not known 
whether counsel knew of this or not. If he did and didn't raise it, it is further affects of the 
conflict of interest he admitted he had as his basis for wanting to be disqualified (see 
exhibit 4) in that if he knew then he failed to prepare a defense, if he didn't, he failed to 
investigate and prepare a defense. See Holland and Classon, supra, citing Osborn v. 
Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 625 (10th Cir. 1985). See also Banks, supra; Osborn at 629. 
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If the prosecutor knew and failed to disclose, which he did, upon request or not, 
then we have both due process and 6 amendment issues as well as violations of article 1 
§§ 7, 12; § 77-32-1 (2)(3)(4)(1998); renumbered § 77-32-301 (1999 Supp.) because 
16counsel failed to have undivided loyalty, see Holland at 360-61, because of his conflict, 
failed to utilize investigatory resources available to him, see State v. Bums, 4 P.3d 795 
(Utah 2000), which constitutes failure to investigate and prepare a defense, see Osbourn, 
Banks, and Holland, supra, constitutes a deprivation of due process rendering counsel 
ineffective, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Cronic v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 648,659-62 (1984), preventing a fair trial, violating due process 
rendering the conviction fundamentally unfair as manifest injustice. See Banks, id. at 
1516, 1522. 
Because there was no opportunity for the appellant to present his evidentiary facts 
at a lower court hearing the court erred in not conducting a hearing and granting relief. 
See Brecht and Oneal, supra at 3. The convictions are a miscarriage of justice. Because I 
can show evidence of self-defense this not only negates the intent of felony murder but 
necessarily voids the aggravated robbery also because there simply was NO ROBBERY. 
See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). 
These issues were critical and material to the guilt or innocent determination in 
this matter. The GSR test of the victim was critical also for the self-defense theory when I 
stated he fired at me first. The State denied that the GSR test was 17ever preformed on the 
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victim after repeated request but it was found after trial that conclusively it was done 
and there were results. (See exhibit 3.) I 
This further would have supported my lack of intent to want to hurt the victim 
much less kill and rob him. I never intended to hurt him, he intended to hurt me. This is 
evident, he produced the weapon, fired it at me, I had no weapon and brought no weapon 
out with me that night. Since intent is an element of the offense it was never conclusively 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Knoll; in re Winship, 397 U.S. 358-364 (1970); 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). 
The prosecution lied on several occasions of the testing of and results of GSR tests 
being performed on the victim. (See exhibits 3,4.) 
A. On February 2, 1999 a specific discovery request was made for the GSR test 
results. On March 9, 1999 the prosecution said no test was performed. 
B. On May 6, 1999 a second specific request was made by defense for the GSR 
test results and a specific "no test was preformed" answer was given by the 
prosecution on May 17, 1999. (See exhibit 4.) 
The prosecution intentionally withheld these results and affirmatively "lied" of 2 
facts; that no tests were preformed and no test results existed. (Let it be known that if 
defense counsel knew they existed this rendered him ineffective because in either case it 
destroyed my affirmative proof of the self-defense theory and manslaughter theory, 
destroyed my ability to prove decedent's propensity to violence which is supported in the 
record.) 
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In any event it is on the record the prosecution lied of its existence and the State on 
my first appeal furthered this lie. See supra at 10. Contrary to the State's "unfortunate" 
position that crippled my defense and made the State's case look stronger than the facts 
actually supported. Kyles, at 429. 
Further, to bolster my position in 5 different defense areas, all denied by the State 
of their existence, are found in the medical examiner's report and supported in the other 
parts of the record are the following; 
A. The syringes in the victims truck were never tested, some of which had liquid 
residue in them; 
B. The black substance (27 grams) were never tested; 
C. There were old and fresh needle marks in the victims right and left arms (see 
exhibit 3, M.E. report); 
D. The decedent tested positive for consumption of amphetamine and 
methamphetamine (see exhibit 3, Tox. Report); 
E. (and most striking) The right and left hands were GSR tested, bagged and the 
test results were placed into evidence (see page 2 M.E. report exhibit 3.) 
These lies, nondisclosures and withholding of critical exculpatory evidence had a 
substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, my due process and fair trial rights, 
my 19affective counsel rights and effectively denied my effective review of the conviction 
on my first appeal of right. See Brecht, Kyles, Evitts, Walker, supra. 
18 
There is a strong probability, had all this been disclosed to the defense jury, and 
court, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. This was material 
evidence and constitutional error has resulted. This was not only material to affirmative 
defenses but went to the heart of the fact finding process delineated by Winship, 397 U.S. 
358-64 (1970), and was determinative to guilt, innocence or lesser degree of punishment. 
United States v. Baglev, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 685 (1985). 
Because of the nature of the withheld evidence, because case was close, the 
suppressed evidence put key testimony in doubt, United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308, 
1318(11 Cir 1997), violation when prosecution deliberately suppresses evidence 
corroborating defense. United States v. Uldechukwu, 11 F.3d 1101, 1106 (1st Cir. 1993); 
The judicial inquiry must focus on the effect on my rights not prosecutor's intentions, 
Brown v. Borg, 951 F2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991); because, government's bad faith 
attempt to suppress (exculpatory or material) evidence indicates that such may be 
material. United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1311+ n.4 (7th Cir. 1986). 
It is apparent that the district court erroneously concluded that the cumulative 
impact that the suppress/withheld evidence had on my rights as well as trial. The 
assessment was wholly improper because a prudent judge should have grave doubt or 
virtual equipoise he should have found in my favor. Oneal at 435-36, supra at 3. 
It is conclusively proven in the record my intent was not to kill, this being 
inferred by the fact I brought NO weapon to the scene, see Bisner, 2001 Utah 99 TJ 4,1 
was intoxicated, 13, the decedent came with weapons, f^ 6 (the rest of the paragraph is 
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contrary to the clearly established record which proceeds); he has the propensity to 
violence, had a 31" chain, used drugs which creates extreme paranoia and hostility, had 
been ingesting drugs and all other inferences and arguments herein. Supra at 13-18. (See 
exhibits 3,4.) 
Therefore all facts necessary to constitute both offenses I was charged with most 
emphatically are not proven beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury was never 
presented with ALL facts necessary to properly determine whether I was guilty as 
charged, of a lesser crime or factually or legally innocent under the force in defense of 
person. § 76-2-402. See § 76-1-501 (1999), § 76-1-503 (1999), § 77-17-1 (1999), § 77-
17-3(1999), §77-17-10(1999). 
Further Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 16(a)(l-5), (b), was violated 
continually by the state as well as my due process, fair trial and equal protection rights 
under both state and federal constitutions. 
The autopsy, Final Pathological Diagnosis and Toxicology reports were available 
by February 5, 1999, well before they were requested. It cannot be said that the State 
didn't know of their existence but they intentionally suppressed their existence to gain a 
tactical 21advantage over me at my trial. The autopsy was done on January 6, 1999 
witnessed by two detectives who are arms of the prosecution. At that time they knew of 
the illegal drug consumption, needle marks and GSR results which were "submitted as 
evidence," but again, denied twice when requested. 
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Had the GSR test been negative, the State most assuredly would have used the 
negativity to bolster their case but since the decedent shot first at me, and since then was 
something, some result, submitted as evidence, since the prosecution lied of its presence 
and of the GSR test on two written occasions it must have been positive, then beneficial 
and material to my defense. See Jackson, supra at 19. 
The same with the toxicology reports and testing of the unknown substance and 
syringes. Supra at 13, 14. All conclusively point to the decedent being the aggressor, him 
pulling the rifle and me having to defend my life. That is pure hell for an 18 year old. 
How would this court respond? 
This is the facts. When we got out of our vehicle, Darby stepped out from behind 
the door of his truck holding the assault rifle. When Dustin Symes saw the gun he 
grabbed a bat from out of the cab. Darby yelled that he was going to kill all of us so we 
all ran toward him because we had nowhere else to go. 22Dustin hit Darby with the bat 
and Justin and Derrick were wrestling or hitting him. Then Justin, Derrick and Dustin all 
ran back towards their truck leaving Darby and I still standing there. I saw Darby still had 
the gun so we began to fight over it and as this was happening the gun went off two or 
three times, something like that. Darby finally let go and jumped into his truck. As he did 
this I took cover behind his truck. I didn't know if he had another gun in the truck nor did 
I know if any rounds were left in the rifle. I, as he started to drive off, fired a couple 
rounds trying to scare him off because I didn't know if he was coming back after me. 
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From the time the others left to this point was a few seconds. I didn't know what 
was going to happen next or if he had another weapon so I took off running thinking I 
may have scared him enough so I could get away. I didn't know Darby was dead until the 
police told me he was. I did not mean to shoot him, I only meant to diffuse the situation 
or to rob him. There was no intent on my part and this is proven from the testimony of my 
co-defendants and in other parts of the record and by the fact I did not bring a weapon at 
all to the scene. 
If I would have took 6 shots at Darby's truck myself, the truck being no more 
than 20 feet away I if having the intent to kill, could have hit him with the first shot. 
Assault rifles are extremely accurate. But testimony conclusively proves there were 2 sets 
of 2 or three shots with a gap in between each set. The first set was over the scuffle over 
the rifle and the second was when I tried to scare him away. There were only 2 holes in 
the truck owned by Darby. 
I did not intend to commit any crime against Darby. I never wanted to fight, shoot 
or be accused of robbing him, which I didn't rob him. I still grieve over his death today 
because I didn't want any harm to happen to him. 
Now looking at the previous failures of prosecution's disclosures, the prosecution 
under rule 16(a)(4) he further failed in disclosing evidence which negates the guilt, 
mitigates guilt or degree of offense or reduce punishment, which is part of his continuing 
duty to disclose as well as his duty under due process to make disclosure even if no 
specific request has been make. See Agurs at 106, 110-113, also n22. 
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The relevant material the prosecution omitted that mitigated guilt, punishment and 
that reduce punishment are the uncontroverted facts as listed 24below that is in the record 
(and I also realize that this is partly defense counsel's error also but the prosecutor also 
has a due process duty to ensure my trial if fair under Winship, Agurs, and Bagley), 
1. There were, on either side, no expert witness testimony to deal with these 
issues. 
a) The grouping of the spent casings found on the ground at the crime scene a 
pile of 2 or 3 in 2 different places would have indicated and supported the 
claim he shot at me first and I acted in self defense; 
b) That there were two different sets of shots as indicated in testimony of the 
State's witnesses. See [?] at Tf 7 (although the statement the Supreme Court 
relied on is mistaken it never the less shows that it is known that two sets of 
shots were fired. (See exhibit 1)); 
c) Evidence conclusively proved that there were wild shots taken which 
supported a struggle between Darby and I and this is evidenced by 2 bullet 
holds in the roof of a building this [is] conclusive because the only shots 
that were fired in the whole incident were those fired by Darby and I; 
d) That testimony from ballistics expert was needed also for showing that there 
were only 2 bullet holes in the truck and that the bullet that had struck 
Darby was a 25ricochet which would have proven that I did not intend to kill 
him, only scare him, because I did not know whether he had another gun in 
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the truck or whether he was going to try to run over me with the truck (see 
exhibit 6); 
e) Evidence supported that I was paranoid because of my drug abuse 
(voluntary intoxication, see § 76-2-306 (1999)), whether I was in the "fight 
or flight" mental state because of the attending circumstances and whether I 
could actually form the intent or whether I was actually reckless or 
operating under extreme emotional disturbance and the fact I kept the 
weapon (because I didn't know he was shot much less dead) was to keep 
him from overtaking me and shooting me, not to rob him as accused; 
f) Medical testimony of the contusions on co-defendants were products of 
being hit by Darby or the 31" chain, that had metal attachments on the end, 
which would have shown him to be the aggressor and that by the fact he had 
the metal attachments on the end of the chain would show his intent and 
propensity to violence. (See exhibit 7.) 
g) Expert testimony because the facts existed, of how both Darby and mental 
states were altered by drug abuse and how that inhibited my ability to think 
rationally since the circumstances were the way they were and my 
codefendants ran away leaving me alone with Darby; 
h) And since all this happened so quick proved it was not a product of pre-
planning since I did not bring any weapons would show self defense and 
also lack of intent because I didn't have the time to form the necessary 
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intent to commit murder or robbery because I lacked clairvoyant skills 
necessary to know that Darby was brining the rifle and chain, that he was 
going to shoot at me, attack me and that my co-defendants were going to run 
and leave me there; 
i) If you also note from the Supreme Court's opinion at fflf 6 and 7 that co-
defendants Symes and Koontz were the initial aggressors of the group I was 
with, not me and it was Symes that had and threw the bat at Darby, not me 
which conclusively proves I did not go to this meeting with the intent to 
hurt Darby nor was it me who arranged the meeting it was Koontz and 
Symes after Darby returned their 27call at about 2:00 a.m. on January 6, 
1999 and the meeting, as stated by the Supreme Court in ^  3 of the opinion 
of case #20000026 was "because of the late nature of the call" which 
ended up at the meeting at the strip mall to settle that dispute, that did not 
involve me so this would have disproved my intent to kill him and my 
involvement because of the alleged drug debt. The fight was over the late 
nature of the calls a dispute originally involving Koontz and Symes; 
j) The prosecution presented an improper legal argument and misled the jury 
by proffering that the fight was over a drug debt and not over the correct 
issue viz, the late nature of the phone call, which improperly stated the 
evidence and facts which denied due process and a fair trial; 
k) Lastly, the statement of Darby's wife conclusively proves I was not 
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concerned over the money, the purported $350.00, he owed for drugs but 
evidence proves that the fight was over the late phone call initiated by the 
co-defendants, not me, and the prosecution failed to explain this which 
further misled the jury. (Exhibit 8.) 
The prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary, because acting as a 
representative of a sovereign has an obligation, not that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done. Banks, 1517 nl9. 
In this case there were two specific requests for discovery made which were not 
folly disclosed or else lied about as stated previously. The prosecution has the duty to 
disclose irregardless if a request is made if it is exculpatory evidence or mitigates the 
crime, degree of crime, or punishment, Banks, 1517; Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(4), and that 
is continuous duty. Rule 16(b). 
Moreover give the prosecutor's unique role in our justice system he must resolve 
close cases and doubtful questions in favor of disclosure, Banks, id., because the 
exculpatory nature of particular evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the 
entire record is complete. Id,, Aqurs at 108. The prosecutor must exercise this discretion 
carefully because he alone can only know what is not disclosed therefore it is him alone 
that the court assigns the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all 
such evidence and make disclosure when the point of "reasonable probability" is reached. 
Banks, id. 1517 (citations omitted). Therefore the conclusion he abused his disclosure 
obligation in this case cannot be ignored. 
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In reviewing the materiality of the withheld evidence singularly but look to 
cumulative impact and its utility to the defense as well as its potentially damaging 
impact to the prosecution's case and this must be reviewed in view of the entire record to 
see if 
the "omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." Banks, at 
1518 (citations omitted). This must be answered in the affirmative. 
What might be considered insignificant evidence in a strong case might suffice to 
disturb an already questionable verdict. Banks, id. at 1518. 
This case is not a close case. Had the State not withheld the favorable evidence the 
jury would have not found me guilty as charged. The withheld evidence, even without 
defense errors discussed later, made the State's case looks stronger than the full facts 
would suggest and conveniently enough, the evidence I needed to support my self defense 
argument. Knoll, id. 214. 
This Court must realize that this evidence if the hands of competent defense 
counsel could be used to "uncover other leads and defense theories." Banks, Id. 1519. 
Thus you may draw reasonable inferences as to that those other lines of defense may have 
been. Id. 
Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that had it been 
disclosed to the defense that result of the proceedings would have been different. This is a 
probability "sufficient to undermine your confidence in the outcome." Banks 1518. This 
Court's confidence in this case should be undermined. 
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Sub-Argument A (cont): "Ineffective counsel, trial, and appellate ." 
Now joining these two arguments together it is reasonable to say that defense 
counsel on some of these propositions should have reasonably known or did in fact know 
of the prosecution's possession of these pieces of evidence. However the prosecutor's 
obligation to turn over evidence in the first instance stands independent of the defendant's 
knowledge, period. Banks, id. 1517. 
And, I also present that appellate counsel failed to raise the disclosure issue as I 
have here and made it know to him, thus he was ineffective for his failure to raise 
ineffective trial counsel as I ask and the disclosure issue fully on direct appeal because 
trial counsel, if the court states or rules that the prosecution did not withhold the evidence 
(how a court could say that in light of the facts and case law I do not know) then I assert 
that trial counsel was ineffective in using it in my defense and appellate counsel was 
ineffective in its failure to raise these issues. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 
(1985); Banks, id. 1515 (the citations omitted). 
These issues and facts were "dead bang winners" intentionally left out by appellate 
counsel because of his conflict of interest which is evidenced by trial counsel's motion to 
withdraw based on a conflict of interest and they recommended a specific attorney, a 
friend or friends, of which the court carelessly appointed. See Banks, id. 31at 1515 and 
Osborn 614-15, Holland 361-62. The reason for this is because the State and the 
defendant's positions are necessarily in opposition, Osborn at 629, Holland at 360 , and 
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because the gravity of the charge may affect what a reasonably competently acting 
attorney may do. Osborn at 626. See Banks, id. at 1519. 
The Tenth Circuit has never defined "dead bang winner" with precision but it 
would be as they concluded, an issue which is obvious from the trial record and one 
which probably would have resulted in a reversal on appeal. Banks, id. 1515 n. 13. This 
court cannot hold me responsible for counsels' errors. I tried to get both trial and 
appellate counsels to do their ethical obligations but neither had undivided loyalty and 
deprived me of my counsel, fair trial and due process rights under the 6 and 14 
amendments as well as Article 1 § 7, 12 rights. See United States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d 
1263 (9th Cir. 1992). 
The errors of trial counsel are as follows (as associated with prosecution errors): 
1. Failure to file necessary pre-trial motions for specific court orders to compel the 
prosecution to produce 
A. GSR Test results, 
B. Results of Toxicology reports, 
C. Statement from Darby's wife, 
D. Ballistics expert's testimony, 
E. Grouping of shell casings evidence, 
F. Expert testimony of ricochet of bullet, 
G. Challenging credibility's of the State's witness Mr. Drury who witnessed 
the crime from over 150 yards away at night, 
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H. Failure to conduct tests on the syringes and unidentified substance in 
possession of victim to establish drug abuse and his illegal activity, 
I. Expert testimony of the effects of Darby's and my drug consumption, DNA 
test, etc., 
J. Testimony and admission to the jury on the 31" chain with metal ends and 
on the SKS rifle to prove Darby's propensity to violence along with his 
wife's statement of Darby's violent behavior, always carried weapons 
everywhere he went, 
K. Failure to move for state appropriated expert witnesses, 
L. Failure to use the results of the autopsy report, toxicology reports, etc. to 
destroy the prosecution's presentation of the decedent, ie. needle marks, 
etc., 
M. Failed to marshal all evidence that proved my lack of intent for both 
offenses and which would have bolstered my self defense or lesser included 
offense theory, . 
N. Failed to present evidence found in victim's possession to the jury, 
0. Failed to properly pursue issues dealing with the plea agreements of my co-
defendants Koontz, Pearson, and Symes because the Supreme Court 
practically assigned this error to counsel, not a Brady issue as counsel 
presented, that this further violated my confrontation rights as well as 
discovery rights under rule 16(a), 
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P. Counsel failed to argue that the evidence of prior bad acts on the drug sale 
was not the issue that 33caused the meeting, it was my co-defendants 
Koontz' 
and Symes' argument with Darby over the late nature of the calls, NOT 
anything to do with me, 
Q. Counsel failed to present Darbys' wife's statement that proved that I could 
care less about the drug debt because I was more concerned about Darby 
taking care of his newborn baby and wife. I knew he was having financial 
difficulty. This disproved any intent to harm Darby but showed my 
compassion to him and the element of surprise when he attacked violently 
like he did. This bolstered my self defense theory, 
R. Counsel wholly failed to present any evidence as afore mentioned - the 
evidentiary facts and evidence that would have drew reasonable doubt, 
S. These issues were critical and material to guilt or innocence determinations 
by the jury, 
T. Failed to move, object or argue mistrial based on his experience that the 
GSR test, autopsy, and toxicology reports were being withheld, lied about 
as to their existence and because that interfered with his loyalty and duties 
to his client because he could not properly investigate or prepare a defense, 
U. Failed to move for disqualification in the district court as he did in the 
Supreme Court based 34on his obvious conflict of interest, 
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V. Failed to properly present and argue that the decedent toxicology report 
showed positive for high levels of methamphetamine and amphetamine and 
its psychological effect, ie. paranoia, propensity to violence, etc., 
W. Failed to properly present that I was NOT the aggressor and have an expert 
witness describe the effects of my drug abuse and the "fight or flight" 
theory to help offer evidence of my self defense theory, lack of intent, 
mental state, etc., 
X. Failed to properly present that there were 2 sets of shots, evidence of the 
wild nature of the shots, supra 24-28, the contusions on myself and co-
defendants evidencing the existence of a fight and it should be recognized 
that all 4 of us had contusions, etc., that would either mean Darby was a 
tough individual to beat on 4 individuals or he did indeed use a weapon 
against us, 
Y. All evidence pointed to the fact that this was a surprise, not a pre-planned 
adventure as the State makes it out to be, counsel failed to present this as 
such. See supra 26, 27 H-K, 
Z. Any other error this court could assign to counsel that has been raised 
herein or that the court sees in the record, post judgment 35motions and 
failure to file such, etc. 
Appellate counsel failed on appeal to raise the following issues of which I wrote 
the court by letter, motions, etc. and tried to present: 
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A. That trial counsel was ineffective, 
B. Failed to move for disqualification based on conflict of interest because 
they were friends with trial counsel (and this is obvious because trial 
counsel specifically requested their appointment which was improperly or 
misleadingly granted) and this presented a conflict with properly raising and 
or presenting issues on appeal, 
C. Counsel failed to move for a 23B remand if he reasonably concluded that 
there was not enough evidence in the record to present an ineffective 
counsel issue not to just completely ignore it because they were his friends, 
D. Counsel failed to properly present the issues he raised on appeal which is 
evidenced in the Supreme Court's opinion at ^f 35 through 39 disclosure of 
Lyman agreement; failed to properly attribute the Koontz, Symes, Pearson 
plea agreements to trial counsel error instead of the Brady presentation as 
he done, 
E. Failed to properly pursue rule 16 discovery issues and confrontation issues 
as he should have. (See n.3 exhibit 1) 
F. Raised a search and seizure that had no basis in law and this could have 
been determined with minimum effort 36but substituted it for the "dead 
bang" winner counsel issue as I specifically ask for repeatedly to him and 
the Supreme Court; improperly raised the prior bad acts issue when the 
issue didn't deal with drug debt as alleged but was ineffective counsel 
33 
because evidence conclusively proved the fight was over late phone calls 
not the alleged drug debt and this is and this is conclusively proven in the 
record; (this was a misstatement of evidence that helped confuse the jury, 
had they knew that the meeting surrounded the late nature of the phone calls 
they could have reasonably concluded that I didn't have the intent to kill 
Darby because the meeting didn't surround me or my issues and this could 
have supported my self defense claim by the facts previously raised.); That, 
that evidence should have been excluded and the relevant nature of the late 
nature of the phone call should have been presented as the co-defendants' 
motive showing I had no motive to harm Darby; the manslaughter 
instruction argument was incorrectly presented and the way it was presented 
was not necessarily the issue with it where counsel should have presented 
that the attending circumstances merited conviction for manslaughter not 
'in 
that the language was confusing. This further proves that counsel didn't 
put forth reasonable effort in the proper research of the issues but 
intentionally tried to steer them away from having to assign any error to trial 
counsel, his friends who recommended him, 
G. The merger argument on appeal relying on Shaffer as its basis was 
completely inappropriate from the case at hand, McCovey, itself being 
distinguishable from this case but the proper presentation would have been 
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a single criminal episode argument under §76-1-401 and §76-1-402(1) not 
§ (3) as presented by counsel, 
H. Counsel further failed to raise the other issues dealing with non-disclosure 
evident in the record and as I ask because this would have necessarily 
challenged the competency of those who requested that he be appointed, 
I. Further I raised the issue that it was my belief from information I obtained 
from another attorney that the judge and prosecutor used to prosecute 
together and that I believed this should be investigated and dealt with 
accordingly, that this should have been known also by trial counsel but to 
all concerned, was ignored, 
J. I ask counsel to step down because of conflict of interest then lack of 
willingness to become "involved" in my case, identify with my issues and 
their failure to investigate and prepare a proper defense on my appeal. 
These issues not only present a potential conflict as admitted by trial counsel but 
also prove that the fundamental fairness of my trial was affected by counsels' failure to 
investigate, prepare defenses and properly argue my position in both courts. See Banks, 
Osborn, Classon, and Holland, supra. 
Counsel failed to object to many instances of impropriety and failed as alleged 
herein to perform his ethical and constitutional duties. The first part of the Strickland test 
has been met. There was no possible explanation or tactical reasons for these decisions by 
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either counsel and most of these issues would have been dealt with outside the presence 
of the jury. State v. Maestas, 984 P2d 376, 381 (Utah 1999). 
The next issue is the prejudice component where the reviewing court must 
examine the merits of the underlying claims. Banks, id. at 1516. 
All claims have a basis in state, federal, constitutional and statutory law. See §77-
32 et. seq. These issues in part are either attributable to prosecution nondisclosure or 
ineffective trial and appellate counsel but both bottom on bedrock fundamental due 
process issues and fundamental fairness 39no matter how the error is assigned. Further a 
reviewing court examines the merits of the omitted issues on appeal, Banks 1515, and 
these issues under Banks were "dead bang winners" or errors that would have resulted in 
reversal on appeal. Id. n. 13. This court should reverse or vacate the convictions and 
order a new trial. 
The Habeas court in determining that the petition was not frivolous on its face and 
in ordering response from the State as well as noting the complexity of the issues should 
have appointed counsel under § 78-35a-109(l)(2) because by all rights the court should 
have granted relief under Olano and Oneal; Brecht, supra, because any reasonable judge 
should have had doubt as to the fairness of the conviction looking at the structural error of 
the trial and first appeal. 
Sub-Argument C: "The Supreme Court erred in appointing counsel that was 
recommended by trial counsel who admittedly had a conflict on interest." 
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Because of my lack of ability to research this issue the only case I can find 
factually similar is Osborn v. Shillinger, supra. The Supreme Court by appointing the 
recommended counsel violated my due process and equal protection rights under Evitts v. 
Lucey, supra to an effective first appeal of right because counsel had a self imposed 
conflict 40which is evident because they wholly failed to attribute any error no matter how 
blatant, to trial counsel. The record was replete with instances or trial counsel's failure to 
investigate, prepare defenses, prepare for trial, in filing pre-trial and post-trial motions, 
lack of loyalty, irrational decisions with no tactical basis and counsel failed to identify 
with his client or take responsibility for his cause as did appellate counsel. 
The court will review ineffective counsel claims first time on appeal when the 
record is complete and meets the standards outlined in case law. Maestas at 378. See 
Osborn, id. 614-15. Because of this just as my trial, my first appeal did not take an 
adversarial stance. Cronic, id. at 656-659; Osborn 626-629. Further the gravity of the 
charge may affect what reasonably competent attorney would be expected to do. Cronic 
666; Osborn, id- 626 n.12. It should have been noted by the court that my case is similar 
to Osborn, Holland, and Banks in that my counsel both at trial and on appeal by their 
actions have effectively joined the State in an effort to obtain a conviction because the 
evidence presented and/or withheld most assuredly disproves murder, and wholly 
disproves the aggravated robbery because by the facts of the 41case, some then unknown 
to me, you cannot rob a deceased individual and since, by the facts of the case he was 
dead before I, in a panic, took off with the rifle in an attempt to keep him from getting it 
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if he was to run over me with his truck, I cannot by guilty of that crime, maybe theft but 
not aggravated robbery. The facts prove this. Since I didn't know how many shells were 
left in the rifle or if he had another one or if he was going to try to run over me, I kept the 
weapon only with the intent to keep him from recovering it to shoot me. 
Because of appellate counsel's friendship and obvious conflict which had to be 
present with me trying to get them disqualified, my own pro se motions filed in the 
Supreme Court, etc. (see exhibit 5), it is conclusive by these documents and the opinion in 
exhibit 1 of #20000026 that counsel's tactical decisions on issues on appeal were not 
made after adequate investigation or reasoned judgment and these facts prove 
conclusively that counsel completely failed to investigate the other plausible lines of 
defense and was inadequately prepared to effectively present the tactical defenses on 
appeal that he chose and that he intentionally omitted "dead band winners" because he 
would have necessarily had to challenge the competency of those who 42requested 
specifically his appointment on appeal. Both counsels must present conflicting evidence 
to the court not judge it himself. Nix, supra, id. at 157. An attorney who adopts the role 
of a judge and jury to determine the facts pose a danger of depriving their clients of the 
zealous and loyal advocacy required by the sixth amendment. Id., Osbom at 628. In this 
case neither counsel through the exercise of skill and judgment and diligence fulfilled 
their duties to make reasonable investigations or to properly determine that such 
investigations were not necessary. Stickland at 691. There was no adversarial character in 
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either proceeding and both counsel abandoned their duty of loyalty and effectively joined 
the State in an effort to obtain a conviction. Osborn at 629. 
The trial counsel in their misleading the Supreme Court in appointing appellate 
counsel allowed that court to further the conflict that deprived me of an effective first 
appeal of right. Evitts at 402-405. In knowing that the court didn't do that (intentionally) 
(error) should be assigned to the State which has affirmative duty to know the law of 
their state and law is defined in § 78-27-19 as opinions of appellate courts, etc. State v. 
Patience, 944 P2d 381, 388 (Utah App. 1997). 
43ARGUMENT 2: "The proceedings before all courts involved were replete with 
instances of plain rule 30(a) and prejudicial error which resulted in a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice." 
Not only looking at the errors involved, this case involves exceptional 
circumstances that require the setting aside of legal principles usually asserted by the 
State and courts because my constitutional, statutory, procedural protections as well as the 
court decisions cited herein should (in a properly run administration of justice) be more 
important. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 10(f) allows for waiver for pro se 
parties which works in concert with "liberal construction" mandated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Haines, supra at thereby allowing also, adoption by reference and exhibits of 
any pleading to be a part of proceeding at all stages, see rule 10(c). The waiving of this 
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rule does not have to be made by special request but by the "clerk or the court", thereby 
allowing liberal construction by rule as mandated by courts all over. 
Since a petition is a civil proceeding the rule applied in my case to the habeas court 
as well as to the Supreme Court in case #20000026 by virtue of Utah R. Civ. P. rule 81(e) 
because there was no applicable appellate rule to cover my desperate attempts to make the 
court aware of my conflict with counsel and other issues. 44See Utah R. App. P. rule 1(a) 
for support of the civil rules apply to appeals before Utah appellate courts. I therefore 
assert that position then as well as now, how these errors are viewed are determined by 
the court. Under State v. Knight 734 P2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that rule 30(a) error under the Utah R. Crim. P. is concluded by if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have been had had the error 
never happened. Such is the case here in several areas raised herein. 
Since these types of cases are highly fact sensitive the record of this case does not 
clearly support the verdict of guilty on either charge.,especially in light of the issues 
presented supra at 6-42 and their exhibits. 
In "marshalling the evidence" as requirement ordered by This Court in State v. 
Moore, 802 P.2d at 738 when reviewing sufficiency of evidence it cannot be said that had 
the jury been able to review the evidence of the GSR test, toxicology report, autopsy 
report and syringes and was able to see test results of the black substance or all the 
casings, etc., in and on the victim as well as the needle marks in both arms, they would 
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have still found me guilty as charged or that I acted in self defense or of a lesser included 
offense. 
Without proper or all evidence to review, a jury cannot properly conclude guilt on 
all facts necessary to constitute 45the offenses I was charged with under the Winship 
standard or properly assess witness credibility or make any proper determination when 
critical evidence is withheld or suppressed or not properly proffered. This is rule 30(a) 
error as well as plain error on part of the prosecutor and the court because the court knew 
what we were trying to discover, the habeas court saw the evidence. United States v. 
Clarke, 227 F.3d 874,884 (7th cir. 2000), it was plain under current law, United States v. 
Villareal 253 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 2000); Olano at 734 (see United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725 (1993)) and it is enough for the error to be "plain" at the time of appellate 
consideration. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465 (1997) also allows for plain 
error review even if I failed to assert a right. Johnson 465. 
The record as a whole must be reviewed to determine is prosecutor's misconduct 
denied defendant a fair trial, Clarke at 884 supra, and was derelict in attempting it. United 
States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 115 (2nd Cir. 2000); United States v. Mendez, 117 F.3d 
480, 485 (11th Cir. 1997) (even absent my objection); Deviation form a legal rule is error 
unless it is waived. Olano, 732-33, supra. See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 
159-60 (1936). There's been no waiver. 
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An error exists that is "clear and obvious" when an element of the offense is not 
met, see United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 682 (1st Cir. 2000); Olano at 732-33; 
Winship, supra, which most emphatically is the case here on both offenses. 
Therefore as the Utah Supreme Court explained in State v. Holgate, 10 P3d 346, 
350 (Utah 2000) that 46in a plain error review there is a 3 part test that must be followed: 
(i) an error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the [trial] court, (iii) the error 
must be harmful i.e., absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant or as phrased in Dunn, 850 P.2d 1208-09, or that "our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined." 
Most assuredly this court, with the issues presented, should have their confidence 
in the verdict undermined. I also would like to remind the court that not only do I present 
that the court should liberally construe this complex case under the Haines standard, 
supra, but also that under Utah Rules of Evidence rule 103(d) which states: 
"Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court." 
This further does in fact work in concert with Utah R. Crim. P. rule 30(a) which 
similarly states: 
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." 
Lastly, these further go hand in hand taking in consideration the "exceptional 
circumstances" doctrine this court defined in State v. Archambeau, (passim) (Utah App. 
19) to deal with procedural anomalies listed herein, whether committed by the court, 
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counsel or prosecution which affected my substantial or procedural rights. 
Further this court can review trial court rulings for plain error even absent 
objection. State v. Eldridge, 713 P2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989). 
The purpose of a Petition for Extraordinary Relief is to challenge the lawfulness of 
physical restraint. Not infrequently the fairness of a conviction turns on facts that are not, 
nor could they be, in the record and therefore could not be relied upon on direct appeal. 
Many of the facts alleged herein fall into that category and others attributable to counsels 
or prosecution. 
This is why an evidentiary hearing was so crucial in this proceeding because I was 
convicted in violation of principles of fundamental fairness. Therefore as directed in 
Julian at 254, the court (even though in the context of the limitations argument) stated that 
"if a proper showing is made . . . can never justify continued imprisonment of one who 
has been deprived of fundamental rights regardless of how difficult it may be for the state 
to re-prosecute." The court said also that "a court should grant relief if the petitioner 
establishes that he or she has been deprived of due process of law" or that "it would be 
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction." Brown, id. 969; Julian at 254. Such is 
the case here. 
Further the writ is the most important of all judicial tools for the prosecution of 
individual liberty. Julian 253. 
48The Hurst court at 1036 further stated procedural default is not always 
determinative of collateral attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not 
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conducted within the bounds of basic harmony of fairness or with constitutional 
standards. See Hurst 1036 n. 6. The re-litigated issues herein pass the "unusual 
circumstances" or "good cause" standards of Hurst at 1037 based on the facts stated 
herein. See Hurst, id. at 1035. 
Also this court in Classon and the Hurst court at 1037 n. 10 notes that, as with this 
case, that even if due process is not necessarily implemented "fundamental fairness" is 
and may nevertheless raise a fair question as to whether a new trial should be granted, as 
it should in this case. No matter which way you look at it, this case insults the integrity of 
the judicial process that is supposed to provide procedures that only convict when every 
fact necessary to constitute the offenses charged are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This is not the case here. Not every element in the definition of the offense has been 
constitutionally proven for the reasons set forth herein. Patterson at 210. 
With the fundamental fairness of this conviction brought into question This Court 
should grant relief in the interest of at least fundamental fairness. 
49REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 
Oral argument will be material in the decision of this case as will be a written 




It is respectfully requested that this court reverse, vacate or order a new fair trial in 
this matter or in the alternative, set aside the convictions and direct a judgment for 
manslaughter or negligent homicide as requested pursuant to § 76-1-402(5) and State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) and vacate the aggravated robbery conviction as there 
is no legal basis for this, and vacate the order of the habeas court. 
It is further requested that this court retain jurisdiction as it did in State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). Any other relief deemed just and proper or issue a common 
law writ of certiorari. 
Dated this 8th Day of December 2003. 
RUSSELL E. BISNER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed postage prepaid to: 
Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
0854 on this 8th day of December 2003. 
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